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Abstract 
The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) belongs to new forms of reflexive 
or indirect regulation in European environmental policy. The development of 
European environmental policy is outlined in respect to indirect regulation. By the 
example of EMAS the paper analyses the impacts of indirect regulation. At the first 
level the analysis focuses on the EMAS-participation within the European Union 
emphasising that EMAS turns out to be more a German rather than a European 
project. At the second level the analysis concentrates on the effects of EMAS-
participation in respect to in-company processes of ecological modernisation as well 
as to external, mainly market-based impacts. The results are ambivalent: Positive 
effects are an improved level of in-company environmental protection and enhanced 
legal compliance. However, innovative potentials to organisational environmental 
learning are only partly exhausted. Market effects and improved relationships to 
external stakeholders seldom occur. To attribute these outcomes to specific 
instruments of environmental regulation would negate the multi-level and multi-
centred institutional setting of European environmental policy. Therefore, starting 
points for a more effective European environmental policy are discussed, which 
combine aspects and instruments of direct and indirect regulation. Moreover, options 
to increase the participation of firms in EMAS are outlined.    
 
1. Introduction 
 
In times of enhanced international competition environmental as well as social 
standards are threatened to be reduced or undermined by processes of ‘ecological or 
social dumping’. This challenge to environmental regulation also affects the 
European Union and its environmental policy, which had emerged as a ‘by-product’ 
of European economic growth policy and developed to a fully established field of 
European policy ensuring a comparatively high level of environmental protection. 
However, the creation of the Common European Market as well as the extension of 
the European Union to central and eastern European countries will walk along with 
an increased level of economic exchange and activities within the community, which 
is combined with more or less not-intended ecological side-effects. For example, 
such negative ecological side-effects are linked with an extension of transport related 
to economic activities, an increased usage of soil for extended infrastructures of 
transportation and a more extensive utilisation of natural resources as a prerequisite 
for an increased level of production and services within the European economy. The 
EC faces more severe ecological problems in respect to the entry of eastern 
European states because most of these new member states are marked by a 
relatively low level of environmental standards and a comparatively poor record on 
monitoring and national law enforcement (McCormick 2001: 66).  
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Moreover, public and political debates on the limits to the prevailing regulatory 
approach in European environmental policy, above all in respect to policy 
implementation and legal enforcement, fostered a change in European environmental 
policy. The regulatory approach was supplemented by a market-based approach of 
indirect regulation in the 1990ies which underscores voluntary action, creates 
environmentally oriented information flows in order to direct consumers’ attention to 
environmental friendly firms and products or to economic incentives to environmental 
action. In this new concerto the EMAS regulation on self-regulated but 
simultaneously publicly supervised environmental management systems played a 
key role. The combination of different environmental policy approaches was to foster 
the flexibility and adaptability of European environmental policy in an economic 
environment of enhanced global competition, ensuring a high level of environmental 
protection.  
Many a political actor or regulator at the European level considered indirect 
regulation as a central starting point to innovate European environmental policy in 
order to meet new demands of enhanced economic competition. In this paper1, the 
impacts of indirect regulation on European environmental policy will be analysed by 
the example of the regulation on Eco-Management-and-Audit-Scheme (EMAS). This 
paper embraces eight chapters: After this short introduction the modernisation of 
European environmental policy by the new policy approach of indirect regulation is 
highlighted in chapter 2. In this approach indirect regulation is linked with the concept 
of ecological modernisation at the European level. Chapter 3 provides an overview 
on the political and institutional development of European environmental policy in 
which EMAS was adopted. In the forth chapter the political genesis of the EMAS 
regulation is dealt with. It focuses on the social construction of the ‘implementation 
gap’ related to the regulatory approach of European environmental policy and 
explains EMAS as a process of political competition on regulation. The key traits of 
the EMAS regulation are described in chapter 5. In the sixth section of this paper the 
distribution of EMAS-participation in member states of the European Union is 
analysed. Chapter 7 examines the impacts of EMAS at the establishment level 
covering internal as well as external effects of EMAS. The paper finishes with some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2. Indirect Regulation in European Environmental Policy 
 
The 1990ies can be characterised at least in two ways as a turning point in European 
environmental policy: During this decade European environmental policy was fully 
established as an autonomous policy field of the European Union. Simultaneously, 
considerable political pressure was brought on centralised regulatory mechanisms of 
environmental European law as being inefficient and inflexible neglecting the specific 
institutional settings and environmental states in different European countries. 
Therefore, critics argued in favour of the principle of subsidiarity. Political pressure 
was also directed towards the prevailing character of European environmental law 
and policy which rested on protective norms. Criticism against European 
environmental policy was raised by business associations and some governments of  
                                                 
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented in the seminar on ‘European Sociology’ at the University of 
Florence in March 2004 during my stay as a visiting lecturer. I would like to thank Paolo Giovannini very much 
for the opportunity to discuss my paper in his seminar as well as for his great hospitality.   
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member states of the European Union. In their view the protective orientation of 
environmental policy and law was regarded as a ‘burden on business’ and 
inappropriate to cope with economic demands on flexibility and deregulation in times 
of enhanced global competition. Moreover, the criticism of juridification referred to the 
implementation gap of European environmental law and policy. This point of criticism 
was also shared by environmentally oriented non-governmental organisations.  
Critics of the protection-oriented pattern of legal environmental regulation opted for a 
different approach focussing on the concept of ‘reflexive law’ (cf. Teubner/Willke 
1984; Isaksson 1997; Müller 2002): Reflexive law takes account of the enhanced 
complexity of societies and supranational social and economic spaces and their 
processes of differentiation into a diversity of sub-systems. In this perspective 
centralised mechanisms of regulation and approaches of direct intervention fail to 
attain political goals because they neglect the self-dynamics and the ‘autopoietic’ 
character of societal subsystems (cf. Luhmann 1988). Therefore, external political 
processes are regarded to be insufficient in order to create solutions for 
environmental problems. The rationality behind reflexive law  “consists in the ability of 
regulation to take the needs of subsystems into account and to integrate and co-
ordinate the interactions between semi-autonomous subsystems” (Isaksson 1997: 
306). In this view self-organisation of social subsystems is combined with the 
regulation of interaction processes between different subsystems. The main function 
of reflexive law resides in generating norms for the regulation of interaction 
processes, such as co-operation, negotiation, agreement and conflict resolution, and 
to reorganise the legal premises and prerequisites of interaction-structures. Reflexive 
law intends to create ‘discursive structures’ (Teubner/Willke 1984) for the interaction 
of subsystems, i.e. opportunities for participation, negotiation and agreement which 
enable subsystems to develop appropriate solutions to problems they face. 
Therefore, the approach of reflexive law rejects direct intervention or regulation 
strategies in favour of indirect regulation. At the level of the European Union indirect 
regulation contains forms of ‘management by objectives’ which rests on negotiating 
political goals and opening or enlarging spaces to member states in goal-attainment. 
However, a combination of different environmental policy instruments emerged as a 
new prevailing pattern of environmental European regulation: Regulatory instruments 
were supplemented on the one hand by economic instruments and on the other hand 
by information-based instruments of indirect regulation, as e.g. the European eco-
label and the European regulation on the Eco-Management and Audit-Scheme 
(EMAS). This ‘instrumental mix’ is a result of political negotiation processes between 
different political actors in the field of European environmental policy (cf. Héritier 
1997), above all the European Council, the European Commission, the European 
Court of Justice, interest groups and the European Parliament which successfully 
extended its rights in environmental legislation.  
Indirect regulation is expected to foster processes of ecological modernisation at the 
level of the European Union in times of enhanced economic globalisation. Especially 
since the beginning of the 1990ies a further expansion of economic 
internationalisation can be observed which is linked with an extension of global trade 
on information, services and goods, an increase of financial and capital transactions 
and the emergence of new multinational companies by fusions or take-overs (cf. 
Gouldson/Murphy 1997; Martin/Schumann 1996). These tendencies of economic 
globalisation walk along with an enhanced competition on productivity, costs and 
prices exerting a strong pressure on social as well as environmental standards. The 
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range of action related to European environmental policy is threatened to be reduced 
according to the primacy of enhanced economic competition (Lutz/Roth 1999). 
Therefore, the question is raised, how the European Union can meet the ecological 
challenge in face of an increased economic challenge. The concept of ecological 
modernisation provides a partial answer to this challenge. It has been taken up by 
the European Union in some respect as a strategy in environmental policy. Ecological 
modernisation can be defined as follows (Gouldson/Murphy 1997: 74): It “proposes 
that policies for economic development and environmental protection can be 
combined to synergistic effect. Rather than seeing environmental protection as a 
brake on growth, ecological modernisation promotes the application of stringent 
environmental policy as a positive influence on economic efficiency and technological 
innovation. Similarly, rather than perceiving economic development to be the source 
of environmental decline, ecological modernisation seeks to harness the forces of 
entrepreneurship for environmental gain.”  
The concept of ecological modernisation requires a change of environmental policy 
from reactive to preventive strategies (Jänicke et. al. 1999: 120 pp.). A reactive 
environmental policy is focussed on the compensation of ecological damages as well 
as on waste disposal or an additive utilisation of environmental technologies, whilst 
preventive policy strategies are marked by ecological modernisation related to an 
application of innovative, i.e. integrative environmental technologies saving natural 
resources. Environmental modernisation proposes win-win-situations of mutual 
ecological and economical goal attainment. For instance, recycling strategies and a 
usage of eco-efficient technologies on the one hand contribute to save natural 
resources and integrate environmental aspects into the in-company agenda setting, 
as e.g. by taking account of environmental aspects in decision-making processes on 
technological investments. On the other hand strategies of environmental 
modernisation advocate the reduction of costs, as e.g. in the procurement of raw 
materials and waste disposal. In this perspective ecological modernisation paves the 
way for an improved competitiveness of firms and economies: First of all, it enhances 
the development, production and implementation of environmentally safe 
technologies as a competitive edge. Secondly, it provides firms with an advantage in 
cost competition by an increased eco-efficiency of production compared with 
competitors neglecting the ecological side of cost reduction. Furthermore, ecological 
modernisation is a starting point to a more ambitious structural change of branches 
and industrial sectors integrating ecological demands into structures of transport and 
production as well as into patterns of consumption (cf. Jänicke et al.1999: 121 p.)  
Such win-win-strategies of ecological modernisation require a change of regulation 
patterns in environmental policy from the regulatory approach to more flexible 
patterns of regulation which combine regulatory strategies with market-based and 
information instruments and shift the focus on environmental policy from direct to 
indirect forms of regulation. Such indirect forms of regulation are to stimulate 
processes of ecological modernisation within the EC-member states at sectoral and 
company level by the utilisation of economic incentives (cf. Becke 1999). The 
European Community adopted such policy strategies of indirect regulation to foster a 
high level of environmental protection among its member states (Kraemer 1995: 28 
pp.). These strategies are to create market-based incentives for companies to 
introduce environmentally safe technologies or to continuously improve their 
products, organisation and processes of production (cf. Fichter 1995: 1; Kraemer 
1995: 28). The mixture of policy instruments related to indirect environmental 
regulation still contains commands and orders and prohibitions, but enlarges the 
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spectre of policy instruments by environmentally oriented economical instruments, 
such as environmental taxes on fuel and energy, rates or duties and charges as well 
as market-based incentives. Different political actors in the field of European 
environmental policy opted for strategies of indirect regulation because they 
expected market-based mechanisms to foster advantages of the environmental 
situation within the European Union. In this perspective a crucial role plays the 
creation of new flows of information within companies and in their socio-economic 
environment composed of different stakeholders, such as banking and insurance 
companies, customers and residents or non-governmental organisations and other 
interest groups. The core idea behind this perspective rests on the assumption that 
public access to and the public distribution or reporting of environmentally relevant 
information on environmentally friendly products and production processes are to 
give environmentally oriented companies a competitive edge over conventional 
competitors because of advantages of reputation among customers and other 
stakeholders. In this view a good environmental performance of companies pays off 
because public information flows create an awareness of customers about good 
company eco-performance whereby the demand of goods or services is increased. 
Moreover, environmentally engaged companies may open up new market 
opportunities. Therefore, a control of public information flows on the ecological 
performance of companies is intended to enhance the competitiveness of 
environmentally oriented firms as well as to reduce environmental pollution and 
prevent further environmental damages.  
The European council regulation on “Eco-Management and Audit Scheme” (EMAS) 
of 29th June 1993 epitomises the market-based and information instruments related 
to the new policy strategy of indirect regulation. As regulation the character of EMAS 
differs from other legal instruments of European policy, such as directives and 
decisions. According to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty regulations are generally 
applied and “binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States” 
(Hildebrand 2002: 14). EMAS serves two significant purposes: Firstly, it aims at the 
integration of environmental aspects into the management and production processes 
and the organisational structures of companies with the assistance of an 
environmental management system. Secondly, it is to provide external stakeholders 
with credible and valid information about the environmental impacts and performance 
of companies (ibid: 142).  EMAS does not stand alone as a market-based instrument 
of the European environmental policy. The European Commission and especially the 
General Directorate for Environment intended a double strategy, in which company-
related and product-oriented market-based instruments were to complement one 
another. The European Regulation No. 880/92 formed the foundation of a product 
eco-label for environmentally safe products. Companies can voluntarily participate in 
a procedure whereby their products will be subjected to a product life cycle analysis. 
Thereby products are examined and compared with each other in respect to different 
product categories. The best ten to 15 products in environmental respect are 
rewarded with the European eco-label, the so-called Euro-flower-label. The eco-label 
can be utilised by companies for advertising and customer information. This 
European regulation intends to foster the development, production, sale and usage of 
environmentally friendly products with resource-saving production processes 
(Kraemer 1995: 27). Contrary to this product-oriented regulation, the EMAS-
regulation aims at a continuous environmental performance of companies or 
establishments.  
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3. The Development of European Environmental Policy: From 
Incidental Measures to Institutionalisation 
European environmental policy is a ‘latecomer’ among the spectre of European 
policies. It reflects both processes of policy and institutional learning and embraces a 
broad variety of regulations and provisions which lack a coherent pattern of 
regulation. This diversity is attributed to different ‘philosophies’, levels and 
approaches to environmental regulation which can be attributed to different periods in 
which European environmental policy developed. It can also be explained by diverse 
national initiatives influencing political processes of agenda-setting and legislation at 
the European level (cf. Eichener 1996: 261). Therefore, a co-existence of different 
approaches and instruments in European environmental policy prevails today. During 
the 1990ies a new pattern of indirect and procedural regulation developed in 
European environmental policy which thrust the dominant pattern of direct regulation 
into the background giving since then priority to an ‘instrumental mix’ of European 
environmental policy. EMAS is an important instrument of European environmental 
policy reflecting this new approach of indirect and procedural regulation. The 
emergence of this new pattern is closely linked with specific historical trajectories of 
European environmental policy. Therefore, I would like to sketch the historical 
development of European environmental policy.  
The historical and political development of European Environmental policy consists of 
four different periods2. According to Philip M. Hildebrand three stages can be 
distinguished in which a genuine European environmental policy had proceeded until 
the early 1990ies. The first period lasted from 1957 until 1972. Hildebrand 
characterises it as a stage of ‘incidental’ measures (2002: 16). At this stage the 
political and legal foundations of the European Community were institutionalised by 
the Treaty of Rome on 25th March 1957, which above all aimed at the creation of a 
common market in order to enable an economic exchange of goods, capital and 
services without barriers. The Treaty of Rome focussed on the attainment of four 
goals: a closer co-operation among member states, an improvement of welfare, 
enhanced stability of member states and an improvement of quality of life and 
working conditions for citizens of the European Community.  During this stage a 
genuine institutionalised European environmental policy did not come into existence. 
Environmental policy remained a ‘by-product’ of other European policies which was 
mainly addressed in terms of danger protection (Hillenbrand 1994: 50). Only a few 
articles of the Rome Treaty were interpreted to become starting points to address 
environmental matters3. All political measures had to refer directly to the primary 
goal, i.e. the establishment of a European common market. Therefore, only a few 
incidental and isolated initiatives with regard to environmental matters were taken. 
They referred e.g. to the protection of employees and the public against radioactive 
                                                 
2 The short overview on the evolution of European environmental policy will mainly refer to publications 
of Philip M. Hildebrand (2002) and John McCormick (2001) unless noted otherwise.  
 
3 For instance, Article 2 referred to a harmonious development of economic activities as well as a 
continuous and balanced economic expansion and an intended rise of the standard of living. The latter 
was interpreted to foster an improvement of the quality of life becoming an indirect goal of the 
European community and opening up linkages to environmental issues. Article 36 at least indirectly 
referred to environmental protection justifying the restriction of imports or exports in case of 
endangering e.g. public security, the protection of health and life of human beings, fauna and flora and 
the protection of national treasures. 
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radiation and to a unitary classification and labelling of hazardous substances. A 
coherent program or concept of environmental policy incorporating political goals was 
not conceived during this period. Environmental measures were often initiated behind 
time. If legislation with regard to environmental matters was passed, often low 
standard norms prevailed (ibid). Policy measures in respect to environmental matters 
aimed at removing or avoiding barriers of trade attributed to different national 
standards in environmental protection (cf. Barnes/Barnes 1999: 25). 
The second stage which covered the time span between 1972 and 1986 can be 
characterised as ‘the responsive period’ (Hildebrand 2002: 18). At this stage the 
negative ecological side-effects of a more or less continuous and rapid economic 
growth within the EC and its member states – fostered by the reconstruction of 
European economies after World War II - became obvious. Environmental problems 
of severe air, soil and water pollution in Europe were publicly debated. The first report 
commissioned by the Club of Rome and publications addressing environmental 
concerns, such as Rachel Carson’s ‘The Silent Spring’, nourished this public debate 
(Barnes/Barnes 1999: 26).  In several European countries, especially in Germany, a 
new social movement of environmental activists evolved which succeeded in 
addressing public attention and canalising concerns on environmental problems 
related to economic growth (cf. Stamm 1988; Castells 2001). Moreover, some 
member states emerged as ‘frontrunners’ in environmental protection within the 
European Community advocating an environmental policy at European level. For 
instance, Germany set up the first nationwide environmental action program or 
France established the first ministry of environmental affairs among European 
member states. Last but not least, the first World Conference of the United Nations 
on the Human Environment in Stockholm emphasised the relevance of environmental 
policy. The starting point for a coherent approach in European environmental policy 
was the Paris Summit Conference in 1972 where the head of states or governments 
requested the European Commission to develop a blueprint for a European action 
program in environmental policy. The ‘First Community Action Program on the 
Environment’ (1973-1976) was approved of the Council of heads of governments or 
states in 1973. This environmental action programme is a landmark in the 
development of European environmental policy: It introduced environmental 
protection as a matter of joint political action at the European level. For the very first 
time guiding principles of an environmental policy were agreed on, objectives were 
set and priorities for environmental action were fixed. The action program contained 
some far-reaching principles to be still valid today in European environmental policy, 
as e.g. the idea of preventive environmental policy or the principle of internalising 
external costs triggered by environmental polluters (cf. Wepler 1999; Hildebrand 
2002).   
This action program also reflected the principle of subsidiarity in European 
environmental policy: Germany and France objected to a larger extension of legal 
competencies at the European level. Therefore, the action program was not 
approved of by a formal council decision, but rather on basis of a joint declaration of 
the European Council. This compromise took account of French and German 
interests. It established a shared responsibility between the European Union and 
member states defining environmental actions to be implemented at the European 
level and at the level of member states. This shared responsibility also implied that 
environmental action programs are not legally binding, but rather serve as guidelines 
of European governance. Notwithstanding, environmental action programs constitute 
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at least a normative basis for environmental policy at the European level (cf. Wepler 
1999: 144 p.). 
Since then six European environmental action programmes were adopted creating a 
framework for joint environmental action on the European level4. The central 
functions of environmental action programs consist of creating consensus on guiding 
principles and objectives among European member states and initiating new steps of 
a European environmental policy (cf. Vittinghoff 1992; Baumast 1998). During the 
responsive period of European environmental policy three different environmental 
action programmes were agreed on by member states. Both of the first and the 
second environmental action programs shared a common feature: The measures of 
environmental policy were mainly directed to the environmental policy principles of 
compensation or repair (cf. Bongaerts 1990; Taschner 1994; Baumast 1998). 
Contrary to these action programs the third environmental action program (1982 – 
1986) underscored an environmental policy of prevention and is characterised by an 
integrative approach on environmental policy instruments. An example of this shift is 
the European directive on environmental impact assessment which is compulsory for 
companies or projects which might create severe damages to the environment (cf. 
Kaupe 1998: 202; Spindler 1990: 48). Moreover, the third environmental action 
programme was quite successful in stimulating legislation because between 1983 
and 1985 more than 40 directives, eight decisions and ten regulations were adopted 
(Hildebrand 2002: 20).   
Nevertheless, the most significant driving forces to the establishment of a common 
environmental policy at the European level were economic interests. The different 
national laws and provisions to environmental protection were regarded as potential 
barriers to economic competition within the EC. Member states with a higher level of 
environmental protection promoted successfully a harmonisation of European 
environmental policy, setting more ambitious objectives in order to escape higher 
costs of adoption compared to member states with a lower level of environmental 
protection. For example, The Netherlands and Germany promoted a generalisation of 
higher environmental standards at the European level because in both of the 
countries high standards of environmental protection linked with regulatory 
approaches prevailed. Still lacking a legal fundament European environmental policy 
remained in a subordinate position to the dominant economic objectives of the 
European Community. 
The responsive environmental policy during the 1970ies fostered the introduction of 
environmental law in European member states which before lacked a set of 
environmental legislation. Moreover, it established a platform for further joint action in 
European environmental policy. Joint environmental action rested mainly on the 
adoption of commands and prohibitions in respect to environmental matters fostering 
a regulation pattern of ‘command and control’. A variety of environmental directives 
were passed which had to be adopted by European member states in a specified 
time span. Nevertheless, the implementation of these directives was often delayed, 
partly adopted or not adopted at all by single member states, if the directives 
contradicted to national environmental legislation or confronted member states with 
high expenditures (cf. Hillenbrand 1994: 52).                       
                                                 
4 A more detailed overview on the six European action programs on the environment is provided by 
Norbert Gorißen (2002).  
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The third stage of European environmental policy development can be described as 
the ‘period of initiative’ (1985 – 1992). Above all, initiative relates to the formal 
institutionalization of European environmental policy on grounds of the so-called 
Single European Act (SEA) as a further development of the Treaty of Rome. The 
SEA entered into force on 1st July 1987. This legal institutionalisation of 
environmental policy can be attributed to the planned enlargement of the European 
Union from six to 12 member states in 1992 and to the primary goal to complete the 
creation of a common European market. The European Commission founded a task 
force on the environment and the internal market to assess potential ecological 
impacts of the enlargement of the common market. The task force draw the 
conclusion that a disintegration of economic growth and environmental destruction 
can only be achieved by an institutionalised European environmental policy (cf. 
Barnes/Barnes 1999: 38 p.; Hildebrand 2002: 26).   
Therefore, the SEA created the first legal, formally approved foundation of 
environmental policy at the European level by the introduction of a specific title on the 
environment whereby institutional changes within the European policy framework 
were initiated (cf. ibid; Hillenbrand 1994). Environmental protection became an equal-
ranking field of European policy. In Article 130r the goals, principles and guidelines of 
the European environmental policy were formulated. Moreover, the competencies of 
member states and the European Union were divided. The SEA also permitted single 
member states to advance as environmental frontrunners by setting higher 
environmental standards than agreed on at the European level. The SEA established 
the option of a qualified majority voting of the council of ministers with regard to 
environmental policy. This new procedure provided a framework for the extension of 
environmental legislation at the EC-level and was reinforced by the European Court 
of Justice. The procedure contradicted to the principle of unanimity, which had 
prevailed until then as a prerequisite for taking environmental action at the European 
level. The new procedure raised the barriers to single member states to reject 
environmental initiatives for legislation making use of a veto. The procedure of 
majority voting also played an important role in the decision-making process on 
EMAS at the council of ministers’ meeting in 1993. Institutional change by the SEA 
resided also in the introduction of the ‘co-operation procedure’ enhancing the political 
influence of the European parliament in the legislative process on environmental 
legislation.  
The SEA contained a new principle of European environmental policy emphasising 
that environmental demands should be integrated into other European policies, i.e. 
environmental policy became a cross-over-policy of the European Union (Hildebrand 
2002: 29). The environmental goals fixed in the SEA were broadly formulated in order 
to extend the range of competencies of the European Union in respect to nearly all 
environmental aspects. Moreover, it included principles of environmental policy which 
went beyond of a policy of repair and compensation, as e.g. the SEA also 
underscored the principle of prevention in respect to environmental damages 
crossing national and European borders. Among other principles it also emphasised 
the principle of taking account of the interests of developing countries and fixed the 
principle of a concerted co-operation between member states with regard to the 
development and the implementation of environmental measures.  
The legal institutionalisation of the European environmental policy was also mirrored 
by the establishment of the General Directorate on Environment within the European 
Commission. The period of initiative was characterised by a qualitative change in 
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European environmental policy altering the focus from danger protection to risk 
management and prevention of environmental damages, as e.g. in environmental 
impact assessment. During the period of initiative the European Commission entered 
into force the fourth European action programme on the environment. Contrary to the 
other action programmes it introduced a perspective of environmentally focussed 
product policy to the European environmental action agenda laying the foundations 
for the European product eco-label (cf. Bongaerts 1990; Weizsäcker 1990).   
Compared to previous periods the range of environmental policy instruments was 
enlarged as well as the number of directives or regulations on the environment 
increased (Hillenbrand 1994). 
According to McCormick (2001: 61) the fourth period of the development of European 
environmental policy started in 1993 and still has been continuing today. It can be 
characterised as a period of ongoing but consolidated institutional change. First of all 
several tendencies can be observed as consolidation of European environmental 
policy. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1993) enhanced the relevance of 
environmental policy by the integration of the environment as policy goal into the 
opening articles of the treaty. In Article 130r the qualified majority voting is stated as 
the rule on most environmental issues. Consolidation also characterises the 
legislative process on environmental matters because between 1993 and 1999 the 
number of new laws on the environment stagnated or declined in relation to an 
increase of legal amendments (ibid.: 63-64; Schwarz 2002: 28): 72 per cent of the 
pieces of environmental legislation between 1995 and 1999 consisted of legal 
amendments. Whilst between 80 and 90 per cent of environmental laws adopted by 
the Council of Ministers at the end of the 1970ies were new pieces of legislation, this 
share fell to 20 per cent in 1995 and 1997. This tendency to consolidation can be 
explained by a variety of causes: For instance, the Santer Commission (1995 – 1999) 
preferred a consolidation of existing environmental laws and activities rather than 
acting as a promoter in environmental policy. The reinforcement of the principle of 
subsidiarity within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty led to a decline in new 
environmental initiatives (McCormick 2001: 63). According to this principle 
environmental problems should be dealt with at the appropriate level of action, as 
e.g. the local, regional, national or European level.  
Moreover, consolidation prevailed because the European political institutions were 
challenged by a crisis of legitimacy. At the end of the 1990ies public debates on a 
lack of democracy related to the political institution of the European Union as well as 
to its legislative and decision-making process intensified. In the field of environmental 
policy such debates were initiated and advocated by non-governmental 
organisations, above all environmentally oriented interest groups, consumer 
protection activists and trade unions (cf. Röscheisen 1992; Hildebrandt 1992). These 
interest groups - among other aspects - criticised the European Commission’s 
stakeholder consultation in the process of developing legislative proposals. In 
response to this public debate the European Commission developed and distributed 
a larger number of green and white papers on environmental and other issues which 
aimed at stimulating public discussions on environmental problems and at the 
involvement of interest groups. Therefore, the European Commission opted for a 
strategy of ‘stimulating more and legislating less’ (McCormick 2001: 65). This new 
strategy was reinforced by political and public debates on the implementation gap of 
European environmental policy. Therefore, the European Commission was bound to 
assess critically environmental legislation and their implementation within European 
member states. This debate on apparent implementation problems fostered indirect 
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regulation to be recognized as an alternative or at least complementary approach to 
the dominant regulatory approach.    
The fourth period of European environmental policy contains also an innovative 
character, which starting points were a critical evaluation of the regulatory approach, 
the problem of implementation and the crisis of social legitimacy related to European 
institutions. Facing these challenges the European Commission developed the Fifth 
European Action Programme on the Environment (1993 – 2000). It is in at least three 
respects a further milestone of the European environmental policy: First of all, it 
proposed an enlargement of the range of environmental policy instruments to give 
priority to new forms of indirect regulation (Gorißen 2002: 190). Procedural forms of 
regulation combined with market-based instruments were preferred to achieve a 
greater flexibility in environmental measures (cf. Kraemer 1995; Barnes/Barnes 
1999). Moreover, the fifth action program emphasised the principles of subsidiarity 
and shared responsibility and stakeholder participation in European environmental 
policy. The principle of stakeholder participation was reflected in the establishment of 
different stakeholder networks (e.g. the European Consultative Forum on the 
Environment and Sustainable Development) as consultative bodies to the European 
Commission making recommendations and reviewing initiatives proposed by the 
Commission (ibid: 43). Therefore, the fifth action program provided the political 
framework, in which the EMAS regulation was developed. Secondly, the 
environmental policy of the European Union was directed to the new guiding 
‘philosophy’ of sustainable development referring to the World Conference of the 
United Nations on the Environment and Development (UNCED), the so-called first 
Earth-Summit in 1992, and its core document, the Agenda 21. Sustainable 
development rests on the “magical triangle” of economic growth combined with social 
justice and sustaining natural resources for the present generation as well as for 
generations to come (cf. Harborth 1993; Lutz/Roth 1999).  
Last but not least, the fifth environmental action programme triggered also a 
significant impact on the European Treaty of Amsterdam coming into force in May 
1999. The principle of sustainable development was incorporated in the preamble of 
the treaty. According to Article 2 of the treaty one of the main goals of the European 
Community consists in “a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities” (McCormick 2001: 63). Despite the introduction of sustainability 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam economic integration still prevails as primary goal of the 
European Union. Compared to this goal environmental policy remains in a 
subordinate position as an “advocating side-policy” (Wepler 1999: 243). On the one 
hand European environmental policy evolved as a fully institutionalized and 
progressive field of European policy. On the other hand its effectiveness is limited by 
the primacy of economic goal attainment and by contradictory demands and goals of 
European policies which attained a comparatively stronger position than 
Environmental policy (ibid: 245). 
Recent developments may lead to a sixth stage of European environmental policy, 
which is characterised by embedding environmental policy in a sustainability strategy. 
The following four core areas of a European sustainability policy were formulated at 
the Göteborg meeting of the European Council in June 2001 (cf. Dyllick 2003: 236): 
 The fight against climate change and an enhanced utilisation of renewable 
energy sources 
 Safeguarding an environmentally oriented mobility 
 Risk reduction in respect to the area of health 
 14
 Enhanced responsibility in the utilisation and reproduction of natural resources     
This sustainability policy is closely connected with the Lisbon strategy the European 
Council agreed on in 2000. The Lisbon strategy focuses on an ambitious goal 
attainment: The European Union is to develop to the most competitive, dynamic and 
knowledge-based economic region worldwide. Initially, the Lisbon strategy embraced 
only economic and social aspects. Therefore, the sustainability strategy agreed on by 
the European Council in Göteborg supplements the Lisbon strategy in environmental 
respect (cf. Klasing/Meyer-Ohlendorf/von Homeyer 2004: 74).    
The core areas of the European sustainability strategy provide a general framework 
for the sixth environmental action program which was adopted in March 2003. The 
action program, which covers a time span of a decade, i.e. 2002 to 2012, defines 
three focal areas of action: climate, biodiversity and health and environment. For 
these focal areas targets and actions are formulated. The sixth action program also 
underscores the political intention to maintain the pacesetter role of the European 
Union in international environmental policy. It remains to be seen whether this 
proclamation will be implemented in practise. In contrast to previous environmental 
action programs the sixth program is advocated by the European Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Commission. Therefore, it provides a 
politically well accepted framework for further negotiations at the European level. 
However, the sixth action program consists of often vague formulations, above all in 
respect to quantitative environmental policy goals and time schedules for 
environmental policy action and its related goal attainment. The program reflects a 
compromise between the European Commission, which favoured an action program 
which was mainly taking account of industry interests in face of a global economy, 
and the European Council and the European Parliament, which preferred a more 
ambitious environmental action program. Because of disagreement among European 
member states the European Commission succeeded in negotiating at least a 
compromise (cf. Gorißen 2002: 196 p.).  Moreover, the European sustainability 
strategy can hardly characterised as coherent because it has to take account of 
different policy processes, documents and initiatives. In 2004 the European 
Commission as well as the European Council advocated competitiveness to be 
regarded as the prime objective of the Lisbon process. Therefore, the environmental 
dimension of the European sustainability strategy might be marginalised (cf. 
Klasing/Meyer-Ohlendorf/von Homeyer 2004: 74)5. It remains to be seen whether 
and to what extent the environmental dimension of sustainability will maintain its 
political significance in the Lisbon process. Moreover, it can hardly be predicted 
whether the European Union will develop a sustainability strategy which also reflects 
the interdependencies between social, economic and ecological dimensions of 
sustainability and creates political procedures to balance the three dimensions of 
sustainability in order to eschew that the sustainability strategy is dominated by a 
single dimension, above all the economic dimension as a significant point of 
reference to increase the competitiveness of the European Union in the global 
economy. However, a balanced approach of sustainability may lead to competitive 
advantages which can hardly be achieved by the preference of the economic 
dimension of sustainability. Such competitive advantages may consist in a high level 
of social integration and a high extent of the reproduction of natural resources (cf. 
Müller-Christ/Remer 1999) as prerequisites of a sustainable economy.        
                                                 
5 Among the 14 core indicators whereby the Lisbon process is to be monitored only three indicators are related to 
the measurement of environmental improvements at the European level (Klasing/Meyer-Ohlendorf/von 
Homeyer 2004: 74).  
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4. Political Genesis of the EMAS-Regulation 
The development of EMAS as an instrument of indirect regulation cannot be 
explained without taking account of political processes. These processes refer on the 
one hand to an arena, in which a debate on environmental legislation, its 
effectiveness and efficiency took place. This debate focused on implementation 
problems linked with the regulatory approach in environmental regulation, which had 
dominated European Environmental policy until the 1990ies. In my view the debate 
on the ‘implementation gap’ (Glachant 2001: 1) reflects a more fundamental conflict, 
in which regulatory core beliefs were at stake. Regulatory core beliefs refer to basic 
assumptions underlying approaches of regulation and of interventions political actors 
prefer with regard to specific policy domains. They contain sets of expectations 
related to the roles of legislators and public authorities in processes of formulating, 
legislating and implementing environmental norms. Moreover, regulatory core beliefs 
are reflected in political actors’ convictions both about regulatory problems the 
European Union faces and the available solutions (cf. Hannigan 1995). These core 
beliefs are closely tied to legal and political cultures political actors are embedded in. 
Taking account of regulatory core beliefs the public and political debate on the 
implementation gap of European environmental policy can be regarded as a 
discursive arena, in which different social constructions of reality regarding 
environmental legislation are negotiated. Regulatory core beliefs prove to be 
essential for another political arena of European environmental policy, i.e. political 
processes of agenda-setting and policy formulation, which create a path dependency 
for legislating environmental norms and law.  
4.1 Regulatory Core Beliefs and the ‘Implementation Gap’  
In public and political debates on the ‘implementation gap’ the positive outcomes of 
the European environmental policy were often overshadowed by problems of 
implementation. Until then the European environmental policy had contributed to an 
improvement of the state of the environment in many member states. These 
improvements did not alone cover member states with a comparatively low level of 
environmental standards and a narrow range of national environmental legislation, as 
e.g. Spain, Italy and Portugal, but rather the European environmental policy proved 
to be innovative even in member states regarded as environmental frontrunners, as 
e.g. the introduction of the EU-directive on environmental impact assessment (cf. 
Weizsäcker 1990a; Rasch/Schlüter 1992; Taschner 1994). Another example of a 
high environmental standard legislation are the directives on the protection from 
pollutants, such as sulphur-dioxide or ozone (Eichener 1996: 261-262). The limiting 
values fixed in these directives went across environmental standards in Germany, 
which were supposed to be very high. Moreover, it became apparent that the 
environmental frontrunners among the European member states did not suffer from 
economic disadvantages in relation to other member states but rather opened up 
new markets and potentials of innovation, as e.g. the case of the development of 
environmental technologies in Germany illustrates (Nordhause-Janz/Rehfeld 1995). 
These outcomes were underscored by studies in environmental policy which hinted 
at high environmental standards to foster processes of industrial innovation often 
combining environmental protection, resource productivity and competitiveness (cf. 
Wallace 1995; Porter/van der Linde 1995)6.  These positive results of European 
                                                 
6 A good example of positive results both in economic and in environmental aspects attributed to the regulatory 
approach is the chemical sector being one of the most important and economically prosperous sector of the 
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environmental policy were mainly attributed to the prevailing regulatory approach of 
environmental regulation. This approach was especially advocated by Germany, The 
Netherlands and Scandinavian member states of the European Union. They 
succeeded in transferring their national environmental policy approach to the 
European level minimising costs of implementation related to European 
environmental legislation. European member states whose national environmental 
policy was based on market-related approaches, as e.g. in the United Kingdom, or 
was characterised by a comparatively low level of national environmental standards, 
such as Portugal and Spain, had to face higher transaction and implementation costs 
induced by European environmental legislation. Therefore, these countries opted for 
a greater flexibility and a broader variety of environmental policy instruments.  
The implementation of European environmental policy contains a “two-stage-
process” (Glachant 2001: 2); at each stage implementation may fail. The first stage 
covers the transposition of European legislation in member states’ national 
legislation. The second stage deals with the practical application of European 
Community law by national administrations. The range of activities which is available 
to such competent authorities covers e.g. individual decision-making, permissions, 
monitoring and legal enforcement. Hence it follows, that European legislation faces a 
dual risk of non- or partial implementation: Polluters as well as some member states 
eschewed or delayed the transposition of European law.  Problems of implementation 
embrace different forms, such as non-implementation, non- or partial compliance and 
an incorrect application of European legislation on the environment within member 
states.  
In the public debate on the ‘implementation gap’ of European environmental policy 
annual reports on the application of European Union law published by the European 
Commission are a central point of reference. These reports illustrate that only 91 per 
cent of the entire 200 European directives were completely transposed into national 
legislation in 1995.  Moreover, the reports hint at an increase of infringement 
proceedings against single member states for the previous two decades (cf. Wepler 
1999: 236; Glachant 2001: 1 p.). Implementation problems can be attributed to a 
variety of causes: They reflect a lack of power related to the legal enforcement of 
environmental legislation at the European level. For example, the European Court of 
Justice did not impose any sanctions or formal punishments on non-complying 
member states. Although the Maastricht Treaty opened legal options to fine non-
complying member states, this option has been hardly made use of by the European 
Court of Justice (ibid: 3). The weakness of enforcement of EU law against member 
states can also be explained by limited monitoring and enforcement capacities of the 
European Commission. For instance, the legal department of the DG Environment 
consists only of about 20 employees (Glachant 2001a: 25). Therefore, European 
political institutions depend on member states and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) or citizens to report violations to or deviations from European environmental 
legislation in the process of policy implementation (McCormick 2001: 65).      
The problem of implementation is linked with the prevailing orientation of 
environmental policy at the EC-level which resides in an approach of ‘command and 
control’. This approach “sets uniform standards, mandates the methods required to 
                                                                                                                                                        
European economy which consists of approximately 9000 companies. Environmental legislation and regulatory 
control fostered the introduction of new cleaner technologies into the chemical sector reducing long-term costs 
and enhancing industrial competitiveness since the 1970ies (cf. Barnes/Barnes 1999: 175).        
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meet such standards, and tries to assure compliance through monitoring the activities 
of member states” (ibid: 67). Besides the lack of legal enforcement or problems of 
policy implementation this approach was criticised by several member states 
because of its inefficiency related to the imposition of uniform environmental 
standards and objectives which did not take account of the different socio-economic 
situations in member states. A detailed harmonisation of environmental standards 
was linked with the disadvantage of a high demand on time and information in order 
to modernise production technologies to comply with legal provisions and altered 
limiting values (Héritier 1997: 182). Moreover, the regulatory approach was regarded 
to be inappropriate to meet the new challenges of economic globalisation and 
economic crisis combined with an increase of unemployment in several member 
states. Therefore, the European Commission was interested in a more flexible, cost-
effective and competitive approach on environmental regulation which favoured 
market-oriented forms of indirect regulation and enabled tailored solutions to different 
environmental situations in European member states (McCormick 2001: 67.). The 
regulatory approach was also opposed by member states which criticised its 
inefficiency or promoted different approaches on environmental regulation. 
In political debates on the ‘implementation gap’ opponents to the regulatory approach 
among European member states, business associations and within the European 
Commission succeeded in underscoring the implementation problems attributed to 
the regulatory approach as core problems of implementation. In their criticism of the 
regulatory approach uniform mandatory standards as means to attain or sustain a 
relative high level of environmental protection within the European Union were 
rejected. Their regulatory core beliefs rested on convictions that market-based and 
voluntary approaches combined with measures of deregulation and an enhanced 
public awareness of environmentally friendly establishments and products would 
provide more efficient and effective solutions to environmental problems than 
‘command-and-control-strategies’. Additionally, these core beliefs often reflected the 
assumption that the principle of subsidiarity should be strengthened in order to 
prioritise national, regional or local entities to develop appropriate solutions to 
environmental problems. Centralised mandatory measures at the European level 
were regarded as insufficient to address environmental problems because they were 
said to negate specific circumstances and prerequisites at national, regional or local 
levels. The increased significance of market-based regulatory core beliefs for 
European environmental legislation during the 1990ies can be attributed to political 
changes in many European member states which were marked by an increase of 
conservative and liberal parties’ governments on the one side and a reorientation of 
social democratic parties, such as the Labour Party in England or the Social 
Democratic Party in Germany, opening up towards supply-side economics and 
market-oriented policy strategies.  
The debate on the ‘implementation gap’ of European environmental policy is a good 
example of the social construction of reality: On the one hand implementation 
problems of European environmental problems cannot be ignored or solely attributed 
to social construction, but on the other hand it is striking, that the variety of 
implementation experiences was rarely taken account of in the debate (cf. Glachant 
2001: 4 pp.): Firstly, the co-existence of implementation problems on the one hand 
and ‘over-compliance’ of several member states in respect to specific European 
environmental regulation on the other hand was often negated. Over-compliance 
reflects the ‘leader-laggard’-dynamics of single European member states. Such 
member states adopted national regulations on specific environmental problems 
 18
which contained more ambitious environmental standards than legal norms of 
European environmental policy. Secondly, the debate on the ‘implementation gap’ 
ignored the impacts of other policy processes on the implementation of European 
environmental law. These impacts resulted partly from other European policies and 
partly from domestic policies of single member states. These policy interactions 
distorted the goal attainment of European environmental policy in several cases. 
They reflect that the implementation processes of European law embraces different 
governance levels, i.e. international, European, national, regional and local levels, 
and involve different environmental as well as other policy arenas (ibid: 5). The 
different governance levels and policy arenas as well as the dynamic policy 
interactions often prevent environmental regulators from forecasting implementation 
problems. Therefore, the process of policy implementation and its outcomes remain 
to a high extent contingent across a multi-level and multi-centred European policy 
system. Thirdly, national administrative structures and traditions which contain formal 
and informal sets of policy beliefs, routines, habits and procedures may turn out as 
barriers to the implementation of European law or at least cause implementation 
delays (Glachant 2001a: 26). The neglect of these and other factors which had 
influenced the implementation process of European environmental law went along 
with the political debate directed to defects of implementation which were attributed 
to the regulatory approach. Political actors who opposed to this approach succeeded 
in challenging the legitimacy of the regulatory approach and in promoting an enlarged 
spectre of environmental policy instruments.         
4.2 Political Competition on Regulation 
The political genesis of EMAS can be explained in terms of “competition on 
regulation” (cf. Héritier 1997; Héritier et al. 1994) between member states at the 
European level. The European Commission plays a crucial role as a gatekeeper in 
the agenda-setting of the European legislative process. The Commission obtains the 
right to initiative for the legislative process. This right is limited by the obligation of the 
European Commission to take account of the superior programmatic norms and 
political decisions made by the European Council as well as the proposals of 
European member states in the process of agenda-setting. The European 
Commission can utilise the diversity of national policy traditions and policy 
instruments which exist in the European Union as a resource for its legislative 
proposals, i.e. the Commission may combine different instruments and policy 
concepts embedded in diverse national backgrounds or institutional settings in order 
to develop the Commission’s legislative proposals.  
The European Commission does not develop its proposals in a political vacuum, but 
rather co-operates even at the stage of agenda-setting with member states. In face of 
a broader spectre of European policy fields and an increase of European member 
states the (intended) political action and strategies promoted by member states and 
other collective actors at the European level can hardly be forecasted by single 
member states or political actors. Therefore, member states which act as policy-
pacesetters on the European level can create opportunity structures to influence 
European environmental policy by co-operating successfully and effectively with the 
European Commission as gatekeeper to legislative agenda-setting (Héritier 1997: 
193). The development of EMAS is an example of such an effective co-operation 
between the European Commission and some European member states, above all 
the United Kingdom (cf. Héritier et al. 1994).  
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During the 1980ies the dominant regulatory approach of environmental policy lost in 
significance compared to market-oriented approaches of indirect regulation. These 
approaches are based on political convictions and ideas of deregulation, market-
based instruments, economic incentives for environmentally friendly measures by 
industry and voluntary action within the European Union and the European 
Commission. In face of implementation problems and inefficiency attributed to the 
regulatory approach the European Commission looked for alternative, more flexible 
environmental policy concepts and instruments. The Commission was receptive to 
environmental policy approaches practised within the United Kingdom. The latter had 
cooperated closely with the European Commission on the agenda-setting of 
European clean air policy because the Commission’s basic environmental policy 
orientations had coincided to large extent with the British political interests and policy 
tradition, especially in respect to the conservative government led by Margaret 
Thatcher. Moreover, the plans of the European Commission fitted with new British 
environmental legislation, as e.g. the Environmental Protection Act of 1990. 
Therefore, the Commission preferred in its initiative on clean air policy the British to 
the German approach of an “engineer-driven”, i.e. technologically oriented approach 
of direct regulation (Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 136), which until then dominated the 
European policy against air pollution. Instead of provisions of precise limiting values 
of emissions the British approach favoured to define goals of environmental quality, 
broad information of the public and self-regulation of firms via environmental 
management systems. The information of the public about the quality of air and their 
involvement in procedures of the official approval of plants was meant to put pressure 
on firms at local and regional levels to improve their environmental performance by 
self-regulation (Héritier et al. 1994). This basic idea was also compatible with the 
principle of subsidiarity of European environmental policy.  
In the competition on regulation the British government – supported by the European 
Commission - promoted successfully its approach of indirect regulation with regard to 
clean air policy at the European level, whilst Germany as a main promoter of the 
regulatory policy failed. In the political decision-making process on the EMAS-
regulation the European Commission and the European parliament, the member 
states and relevant federations, such as employer associations and trade unions, 
were involved. The European Commission and its General Directorate for the 
environment, consumer protection and nuclear safety presented its first draft of a 
consultation document on an EMAS-directive in December 1990, which was based 
on a paper of the International Chamber of Commerce focussing on environmental 
audits (cf. Butterbrodt/Tammler 1996) and US-experiences with compliance audits. 
The European Commission also employed the British Standard 7750 on in-company 
environmental management systems as a kind of blueprint for their first proposal of 
the EMAS-regulation. The British Standard 7750 was the first environmental 
management standard developed worldwide by the British Standards Institute and 
was published in 1992 (Starkey 1996: 61). To sum up the British government 
achieved a competitive advantage being a pace-setter in clean air policy and EMAS 
regulation by influencing the process of agenda-setting in early co-operation with the 
European Commission (Héritier et al. 1994).  
The employer or industrial associations rejected the first draft because it included a 
mandatory participation of firms in EMAS. Therefore, the Commission developed a 
new legislative proposal which contained only provisions of voluntary participation of 
companies. Most of the involved industrial federations - with the exception of the 
representatives of German industry - supported the second draft. The new proposal 
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was also welcomed by all of the member states except Germany. Member states, as 
e.g. France and The Netherlands, voted for the second draft because of different 
reasons: They referred on good experiences with still existing environmental 
management standards within their countries or preferred the voluntary approach of 
the second draft or the idea of indirect regulation (cf. Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 136). 
The political decision-making process was especially marked by the dispute between 
the United Kingdom and Germany (cf. Kraemer 1995; Leitschuh-Fecht 1993; 
Wätzold/Bültmann 2001): The British intended to push for an EMAS-legislation, in 
which EMAS was conceptualised as a voluntary instrument of environmental self-
regulation of firms combined with improved information to the public. The British at 
first objected to a legal compliance of firms and an intervention of public authorities. 
Contrary to this position the German government preferred legal compliance and was 
sceptical of the management-oriented approach to environmental protection. 
Moreover, it supported the idea of an incorporation of product-oriented approaches 
into EMAS-regulation. The German government and the German industry federations 
proved to be the strongest critics of EMAS. The German business associations 
above all criticised the European Commission’s proposal in respect to the information 
and participation of the public. They rejected a relative unlimited access of the public 
to environmental and company-related information, which might give direct 
competitors hints at trade secrets damaging the competitiveness of firms. German 
industrial federations also regarded the EMAS-proposal as unfair because 
companies in European member states with a lower level of environmental standards 
would as well obtain a validated statement of participation as firms in member states 
with relative high national environmental standards, as e.g. Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries.       
In the end Germany surrendered after having previously negotiated some 
concessions at the Environment Council Meeting in March 1993, above all the legal 
compliance of firms participating in EMAS. In face of final ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty the German government was aware of being only able to delay the decision-
making process on EMAS because a ratification based on majority vote would be 
sufficient to pass legislation. After the formal consultation of the European Parliament 
and the committees on economic and social affairs and two further steps of 
amendments the EMAS-regulation entered into force in July 1993 being valid since 
April 1995 (Baumast 1998: 45). 
The solution of compromise on the EMAS-regulation reflects two different cultures of 
law (cf. Thimme 1998; Altmann 1997): In the anglo-saxon culture of law a primacy of 
economic and company-related self-regulation exists with regard to environmental 
law. Interventions by the state or public authorities are of secondary meaning 
compared to voluntary agreements and self-control or self-monitoring of economic 
actors. In the German culture of law a state-driven regulation combined with direct 
controls of companies by public authorities in respect to legal compliance are 
emphasised. The negotiated compromise of EMAS contains innovative features 
because in its core EMAS is an environmental instrument of a publicly supervised 
and monitored self-regulation of companies (Dyllick 1995: 302). For the first time 
environmental management systems are legally standardised and combined with 
external supervision and control. Acting on behalf of this control are members of a 
newly established profession called environmental verifiers who exercise the 
functions of external environmental auditors, monitors and trustees with regard to 
company participants in EMAS (cf. van Bon/Müller 1998; Dyllick 1995; Altmann 
1997). Moreover, EMAS opens up chances of the implementation of an in-company 
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or site-related environmental management system which enables companies to 
define their own environmental goals and priorities. Last but not least, EMAS is said 
to contain market-oriented incentives which foster company-related or corporate 
responsibility in environmental respect.   
 
5. Key Features of EMAS 
EMAS rests on the guiding principle of “controlled self-responsibility of companies” 
(Dyllick/Hamschmidt 1999: 508) combining the self-regulation of companies in 
environmental respect with external controls by competent and independent 
environmental verifiers and market-based incentives. EMAS is based on a voluntary 
participation of companies. Initially, the EMAS regulation did not cover a whole 
company or corporation but concentrated on singular sites of a company. Companies 
willing to have a site registered under EMAS have to meet the requirements of the 
regulation. Therefore, I will turn to these requirements and its related in-company 
introductory process of EMAS (cf. Freimann 1996: 138-145; Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 
137-138; Becke et. al. 2000: 20 pp.; Butterbrodt/Tammler 1996: 104-108): First, a 
company has to develop an environmental policy which defines its environmental 
goals and the guiding principles of environmental action. Although companies are 
free to formulate their environmental goals and principles they are obliged to comply 
with all environmental regulations relevant to a specific establishment or company 
and to a continuous improvement of their environmental performance.  
The second step consists of an initial environmental review, i.e. an analysis of 
environmental impacts and performance related to the site which is to be registered. 
Thirdly, an environmental program is defined which is based on the general aims of 
the environmental policy of the company as well as on the results of the initial review. 
An environmental program should contain specified environmental goals related to 
the site and a description of detailed measures to be taken also including a time table 
of realisation and responsibilities for the implementation of environmental measures. 
The fourth step consists in the establishment of an environmental management 
system laying down the organisational structure on the site-related environmental 
management, responsibilities, resources for the environmental goal attainment and 
organisational procedures. Next, an environmental audit is carried out, in which the 
effectiveness of the management system with respect to legal compliance and the 
attainment of environmental goals are evaluated. According to the results of the 
environmental audit corrective actions are to be taken.  
These four steps form the in-site or in-company related steps of EMAS which are 
followed by further steps related to the public sphere: The fifth step contains of writing 
an environmental statement in order to inform the public about the environmental 
policy of the company, the environmental program, the management system and the 
results of the environmental impact assessment. Next, an independent environmental 
verifier examines the environmental statement and its components, i.e. the described 
environmental policy, the environmental management system and program, the 
internal environmental review and audit procedures. Moreover, the verifier checks 
whether the environmental management system contributes to legal environmental 
compliance of the site or company. In case the verifier declares the environmental 
statement to be valid, management can apply for an EMAS-registration of the site by 
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a specific registration body. In Germany the function of a registration body is carried 
out by the chambers of industry and commerce. The registration body will list the site 
in a register of EMAS-sites open to the public after having checked that local 
authorities, i.e. the supervisory authority board of control being competent for 
environmental matters on a local or regional level, did not object to the registration of 
the site because of any violations to environmental laws or legal provisions. After the 
EMAS-registration the site or company obtains the right to utilise the environmental 
statement and the official EMAS-logo for advertising purposes. It has to be taken into 
consideration that product marketing with the EMAS-logo is prohibited. Registration is 
only granted for three years. A site may renew its EMAS-registration after having 
repeated the environmental audit, updated the environmental program and statement 
and after a further examination and validation by an independent verifier. 
Furthermore, the site is obliged to have improved its environmental performance at 
least within the three-years-period.          
 
6. EMAS in Practise: A European Project?  
The EMAS-regulation is one of the most significant environmental policy instruments 
in the framework of indirect regulation. An impact-assessment of EMAS may hint at 
potentials and barriers to indirect forms of regulation. In this paper the impacts of 
EMAS are assessed in a two-level analysis. At the first level the distribution of EMAS 
within the member states of the European Union is examined. Therefore, I will mainly 
refer to current statistical figures provided by the European Commission. The second 
level of an “EMAS-impact-assessment” will concentrate on an ‘in-depth-analysis of 
practical experience’ with EMAS related to a European member state in which EMAS 
has been taken up very well compared to other European member states. This step 
of evaluation also includes results of case studies on companies which participated in 
EMAS. Case study results may deepen the understanding of specific problems and 
innovations of EMAS-implementation. In this chapter the distribution of EMAS within 
the member states of the European Union is analysed. The ‘in-depth-analysis’ of 
EMAS in Germany will be dealt with in the following chapter. Empirical findings of 
different evaluation studies on EMAS in Germany, which refer to EMAS I, are 
presented. The revision of EMAS by the European Union came into force in 2001. As 
far as I know there are no evaluation studies available which concentrate on the 
impacts of EMAS II at national or European level. 
6.1 Competition on Environmental Management Standards 
A discussion on the effects of EMAS as an instrument of indirect regulation has to 
take account of the competition between EMAS and comparable standards from the 
very beginning. National environmental management standards were introduced 
since the early 1990ies in different European member states: In the United Kingdom 
the British Standard 7750 was utilised and well accepted before the EMAS-regulation 
came into force. In Ireland the environmental management system standard IS 310 
was published in 1994 in order to complement the Irish series of quality management 
standards. As the BS 7750 the Irish environmental management standard is 
applicable to different forms of organisations (Starkey 1996: 81 pp.). These national 
standards of environmental management systems are sufficient for companies which 
focus their business activities mainly on national markets in order to demonstrate 
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their environmental commitment to customers and public authorities. 
Notwithstanding, the main competitor to EMAS proved to be the environmental 
management standard developed by the International Standards Organisation, i.e. 
the ISO 14001. Before turning to the distribution of EMAS at the European level it is 
necessary to sketch the development of ISO 14001 and characterise its main feature 
compared to EMAS. 
The International Standards Organisation can be characterised as a non-
governmental umbrella association of the national standardisation organisations, in 
which larger companies or corporations and business associations play an important 
role with regard to the development and formulation of standards, as e.g. the series 
of quality management standards ISO 9000 - ISO 9004.The headquarter of the 
International Standards Organisation is in Geneva, Switzerland. Preparations for an 
international environmental management standard date back to 1991 when the ISO 
founded the Strategic Advisory Group on Environment (SAGE). SAGE- 
subcommittees were to develop series of standards on environmental management 
which should be compatible with the ISO 9000 series of standards on quality 
management (Schwaderlapp 1999: 89). The Technical Committee 207 dealt with the 
development of a standard for environmental management systems and presented 
its first draft in 1994. The final draft was published in August 1995, but it took another 
year to integrate proposals of amendments by several national standardisation 
organisations. In September 1996 the ISO 14001 was finally agreed on to become 
the first worldwide coverage standard of environmental management systems (cf. 
Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 139; Thimme 1998: 267-268). The ISO 14001 fosters a self-
regulation of companies in environmental respect on grounds of a standardised 
management system. Especially, companies which operate internationally may 
establish an environmental management system according to the ISO 14001. The 
typical stages of ISO 14001 resemble environmental management systems being 
introduced in accordance to EMAS (cf. Wätzold/Bültmann 2001; Schwaderlapp 
1999): First of all, companies have to define their environmental policy, which is 
followed by a second stage of planning procedures to identify the environmental 
impacts of their economic actions or products. The planning stage also requires an 
identification of legal norms to comply with by a company. It also obliges companies 
to define their environmental goals and targets and to establish an environmental 
action program to attain environmental goals or targets. The program is to include 
means and time-frames to attain set goals. The third stage covers definitions, 
implementation, operation structures and responsibilities to implement the 
environmental action program. Moreover, employees have to be trained in order to 
improve their environmental awareness and competence. Additionally, procedures 
and processes of internal and external communication on relevant environmental 
aspects should be introduced to companies. The third stage requirements also 
consist in the documentation of the environmental management system as well as 
procedures of document and operational control including precautions for cases of 
emergency. The fourth step refers to checking and taking corrective action if 
necessary. Checking embraces legal compliance, the realisation of defined 
environmental goals and targets and monitoring environmentally relevant activities. 
The final stage requires periodic audits of the environmental management review and 
a management review carried out by the top management of a company.              
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Table 1: Comparison between EMAS and ISO 14001 
Comparative Features EMAS ISO 14001 
Coverage European Worldwide 
System of Verification Specific (environmental verifiers) Verification integrated in the existing 
ISO certification system 
Focal Locus of Reference All Organisations according to EMAS II, 
but in EMAS I only site-related 
Every Organisation 
Branches Limitation of branches in EMAS I, all 
branches in EMAS II 
Companies of all branches 
Involvement of Public Authorities Yes, in the process of registration No 
Legal Compliance Yes, it is a prerequisite for registration 
also involving public authorities 
Yes, but less tight than EMAS: legal 
requirements should be met 
Preliminary environmental 
Review 
Verified initial review No review 
Product-Orientation and indirect 
environmental Impacts 
Since EMAS II reference to products 
and indirect environmental effects of 
economic action, e.g. in services 
Reference to products and their 
environmental effects 
External Communication and 
Verification 
Publication of an environmental 
statement containing environmental 
policy, objectives, outline of 
environmental management system, 
environmental program and 
environmental performance 
Environmental policy has to be made 
accessible to the public 
Environmental Management 
System (EMS) 
Less transparent structure Clear Structure  
Audits Audits refer to the EMS and to the 
environmental performance with 
specified frequency and methodology of 
audits; frequency of audits: intervals of 
no longer than 3 years, annual 
“updating” of environmental 
performance to demonstrate continuous 
improvements 
Audits of EMS, no specification of 
frequency and methodology 
Contractors and Suppliers EMAS II requires influence over 
contractors and suppliers 
Relevant procedures are to be 
communicated to contractors and 
suppliers 
Commitments and Requirements Employee involvement (EMAS II), only 
employee information and training in 
EMAS I; continuous improvement of 
environmental performance   
Commitment of continual improvement 
of the EMS, rather than a continual 
improvement of environmental 
performance 
Source: Own Compilation with regard to information provided by the European Commission in April 
2001 and to Schwaderlapp (1999) 
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In Table 1 common features as well as differences between EMAS and ISO 14001 
are illustrated. Both of the environmental management standards share some 
common goals (cf. Dyllick 1999: 117 p.): Firstly, both of them aim at establishing an 
effective environmental management system for a self-regulated environmental goal 
attainment. Secondly, they pay attention to legal compliance. Thirdly, both standards 
oblige firms to a continuous improvement of environmental protection without 
providing compulsory criteria for environmental performance. Notwithstanding, there 
exist a variety of differences between both standards.  
The compilation in Table 17 illustrates that EMAS provides in several respects a 
tighter and more ambitious environmental management system standard than ISO 
14001. First of all, companies or establishments registered under EMAS have to 
inform the public about their environmental performance, their environmental 
program and the key features of their environmental management system. Therefore, 
their environmental performance can be easier evaluated by different stakeholders 
and are a potential starting point of voice by stakeholders, especially in the case of 
environmental damages induced by a validated firm. Contrary to EMAS, a 
certification of environmental management systems (EMS) according to ISO 14001 
does not oblige firms to publish an environmental statement available to the public or 
a broad variety of stakeholders. Moreover, EMAS contains an involvement of public 
authorities which underscores the relevance of legal compliance as a prerequisite of 
successful validation. The EMAS-regulation is tighter than ISO 14001 on the 
environmental performance of companies or sites because EMAS puts the screw on 
participants to continuously improve their environmental performance combining this 
requirement with an annual external monitoring. Therefore, an internal force is 
created to set new or more ambitious environmental goals in the process of 
environmental self-regulation. ISO 14001 emphasises above all the continuous 
improvement of the environmental management system.     
Statistical data provided by the General Directorate on the Environment of the 
European Commission in 2004 (see the webpage quoted before) illustrates that the 
distribution of sites or companies registered under EMAS in the European Union 
continuously increased between the end of 1997 and March 2002 reaching its peak 
with 3912 validated companies or establishments. Afterwards a decline in EMAS-
registration can be observed with 3498 registered plants or companies in December 
2003. This decline can be explained by at least two different factors. The decrease 
reflects that obviously a relevant number of companies or sites, which had been 
successfully validated, withdrew from EMAS-participation. These firms often quitted 
EMAS in favour of ISO 14001 or took their leave of EMAS but simultaneously 
maintained ISO 14001 (Loew 2003: 7). Such a management decision of withdrawal 
can be attributed to a disappointment of expectations related to EMAS, above all in 
Germany as a frontrunner state in EMAS registration. During the introductory period 
of EMAS in Germany which started in 1995 German federal environmental 
authorities, the ministry of the environment, consumer protection and nuclear safety 
and the German government as well as environmental consultants and other actors 
willing to push EMAS emphasised the advantages of EMAS-participation for firms. 
The list of potential advantages included e.g. an improved competitiveness of firms, 
direct and indirect cost-reductions, enhanced environmental protection and risk 
                                                 
7  For further and actual information on EMAS and ISO 14001 see the following webpages: 
www.europa.eu.int/comm./environment/emas/index.htm and www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm. 
These websites also contain information of the validated or certificated companies under ISO 14001 and EMAS. 
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management, a higher level of legal compliance, innovations, improved public 
reputation of companies with regard to different stakeholders, a higher environmental 
motivation and awareness of employees and better options to secure employment by 
reducing non-personnel related costs (cf. Becke et al. 2000: 10 pp.). In some respect 
the expectations stimulated by different promoters of EMAS proved to be 
exaggerated as will be described below. Moreover, the decline in companies or 
plants registered under EMAS reflects a competitive edge of the ISO 14001 
environmental management standard over EMAS.  
Table 2 supports the latter explanation illustrating that ISO 14001 evidently 
outnumbered EMAS with regard to the participation of companies or establishments 
in all European member states. Worldwide 61.287 organisations were certified 
according to ISO 14001 in December 2003 (see the ISO-website quoted before). This 
competitive edge of ISO 14001 over EMAS can be attributed to several reasons (cf. 
Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 156): For companies which economic activities are oriented 
towards global or international markets the ISO-standard became an attractive 
alternative to EMAS. Firms which had introduced before a quality management 
system resting on the series ISO 9000 could adapt more easily to ISO 14001, 
because the ISO environmental management standard is highly compatible with the 
quality standards, whilst EMAS is based on a structure which is quite alien to ISO-
standards of quality management. This argument especially counts for firms within 
the supply chain of corporations. Focal firms in supply chains consider ISO-quality or 
environmental standards as a prerequisite for any further co-operation with suppliers, 
as e.g. in the automobile industry. Additionally, the tighter demands of EMAS to firms 
in comparison with ISO 14001 may be a reason to quit EMAS in favour of ISO 14001. 
Tighter demands refer e.g. to legal compliance or to the continuous improvement 
process related to environmental performance. To avoid the screws of an 
environmental performance continuously to be improved firms may opt for ISO 14001 
instead of EMAS. This option will especially be favourable, if a further improvement of 
environmental performance can only be met by new financial investments in 
environmentally safe technologies or procedures or by new concepts of production. 
Such investments are avoided if their positive outcome is questionable or linked with 
a longer time span of amortisation. Last but not least, ISO 14001 may be preferred by 
firms which experienced an imbalanced relationship between expenditures or efforts 
on the one hand and returns on the other hand. This counts especially for EMAS-
participants who were disappointed by little interest of the public or stakeholders in 
their environmental statement. Disappointment of EMAS spread also among the 
management of companies whose expectations to be granted regulatory relief of 
environmental norms and provisions or to gain competitive advantages were not 
fulfilled. Moreover, other expectations, e.g. with respect to cost reductions and 
employee motivation, were only met partly (cf. Loew 2003: 7). Last but not least, the 
introduction of and the further participation in EMAS induced comparatively higher 
costs than ISO 14001 which can be attributed mainly to the publication of the 
environmental statement (ibid).   
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Table 2: Distribution of Companies or Sites with regard to EMAS and ISO 14001 in December 
2003 and in June 1999 (statistical figures in brackets) 
Country No. of EMAS-Registrations No. of ISO 14001-
Certifications 
Germany 2.218 (2085) 4.150 (1400) 
Spain 314 (36) 4.860 (234) 
Austria 298 (189) 500 (200) 
Italy 169 (18) 3.121 (150) 
Denmark 121 (102) 711 (350) 
Sweden 115 (155) 2.310 (645) 
United Kingdom 75 (70) 2.917 (947) 
Norway 42 (58) 350 (72) 
Finland 39 (20) 1.059 (191) 
The Netherlands 29 (23) 1.162 (463) 
Belgium 25 (9) 303 (130) 
France 23 (33) 2.344 (285) 
Portugal 12 (2) 248 (8) 
Greece 9 (1) 90 (6) 
Ireland 8 (7) 170 (82) 
Luxembourg 1 (1) 32 (6) 
Sources: DG XI, EMAS Helpdesk, Brussels, www.europa.eu.int/comm./environment/emas/index.htm and 
ISO World/Peglau, www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm. 
Table 2 shows that ISO 14001 outweighed EMAS in all member states of the 
European Union (before the eastern extension of the European Union took place in 
2004) between 1999 and 2003. The number of sites or companies having 
established an EMS according to ISO 14001 increased in most of the European 
countries rapidly, whilst the pace of EMAS-distribution slowed down or stagnated. In 
some member states even a decline in EMAS registered sites or companies took 
place.  
A remarkable shift related to the ranking of member states according to the number 
of registered EMAS-sites or organisations occurred: In 1999 Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom followed Germany as frontrunners in EMAS-
distribution. With the exception of the United Kingdom all member states are marked 
by a prevailing regulatory approach in national environmental policy. In relation to 
1999 the number of registered organisations in Denmark and the United Kingdom 
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nearly stagnated within the last four years, in Sweden the number of validated 
organisations even decreased from 155 to 115 EMAS-companies. In the meantime 
the number of validated EMAS-companies or establishments increased partly 
drastically in Spain and Italy. According to the European Commission Italy was the 
member state with the fastest pace in the increase of validated organisations in 2003. 
The reason why member states with a legal culture of ‘command and control’ were 
among the EMAS-frontrunners at the end of the 1990ies can be explained by the 
high level of environmental standards in these countries. Having adopted a high level 
of environmental protection EMAS offered a good opportunity to many a company, 
especially to larger companies, in these countries to improve their returns on material 
or immaterial investments in existing structures and procedures of environmental 
protection. The participation in EMAS was combined with high expectations to benefit 
from it, as e.g. to improve customer or stakeholder relations or to gain competitive 
advantages as “environmental-pioneers”. Moreover, a high level of environmental 
protection proved to be a good starting point for an efficient EMAS-implementation. 
The decrease or stagnation of registered organisations in those countries might be 
attributed to a lack of benefits from EMAS or limited positive effects on the side of 
EMAS-participants. 
Member states, as e.g. Spain and Italy, faced different circumstances. Both of the 
countries are characterised by a comparatively low level of legal environmental 
standards and institutionalisation in national environmental policy. Therefore, a lower 
level of in-company environmental protection required stronger efforts to meet the 
demands of EMAS. Additionally, time-lags in the national implementation of EMAS 
mattered. For instance, Italy lacked a national infrastructure of registration bodies 
until the end of 1998 (Kottmann 1999: 20). After this infrastructure had been 
implemented the number of registration rose more or less continuously. The increase 
of EMAS-participants in Spain and Italy can be attributed to companies which above 
all focus their economic action on the European market.                    
The competition on environmental management standards is an example of the 
impact parallel policies or international policy schemes, such as the ISO 14001 
standard, exert on the implementation of European environmental policy and its 
outcomes. In this case the key goal of EMAS to promote a European standard of 
environmental management in the European industry was not achieved because the 
ISO 14001 standard proved to be a successful competitor to EMAS (cf. Glachant 
2001b). However, the competition between ISO 14001 and EMAS reflects also 
processes of policy learning because the European Commission proposed 
amendments to EMAS I which aimed strategically at adapting EMAS in some respect 
to the demands of ISO 14001 in order to enable firms a smooth transition between 
ISO 14001 and EMAS and to foster compatibility between EMAS and ISO 14001. 
This transition rests on a ‘division of labour’ between both of the environmental 
management standards: In this perspective ISO 14001 is regarded as basic 
environmental management standard, whilst EMAS is recognised as advanced 
standard in environmental management (cf. Landesanstalt für Umweltschutz Baden-
Württemberg 2001: 28). For instance, in EMAS II the limitation of EMAS to 
establishments was lifted, extending the locus of reference to ‘organisations’ as 
stated in the ISO-norm (ibid: 2). Policy learning also referred to the implementation 
process and experience with EMAS I. For example, EMAS I neglected an active 
participation of employees and their representatives because above all business 
associations objected to participation in environmental matters regarding it as a 
‘trojan horse’ to an extension of co-determination. However, the implementation of 
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EMAS I illustrated that a lack of employee participation often turned out as ‘Achilles’ 
heel’: A lack of employee participation undermined e.g. the continuous improvement 
process and the in-company-implementation of EMAS because the knowledge basis 
and tacit skills of employees were not recognised as contributions to solve 
environmental problems at the establishment level. Contrary to EMAS I the new 
version of EMAS underscored the significance of employee participation and contains 
a guide to employee participation (ibid). Therefore, EMAS II can be understood as an 
outcome of reflective policy learning drawing on experience with EMAS I and the 
competition between EMAS I and ISO 14001. EMAS II came into force on April 27th 
2001.       
6.2 The Paradox of EMAS 
At first sight the distribution of EMAS-registered establishments or companies in the 
European Union offers an amazing and paradoxical impression: The member state 
which had strongly opposed to EMAS counts more registered organisations than the 
entirety of other member states. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that EMAS 
is more a ‘teutonic’, rather than a European project - including also the Austrian 
EMAS-companies. Taking account of this paradoxical impression one may inquire 
after the reasons why EMAS as an environmental policy instrument of indirect 
regulation proved to be comparatively successful in Germany8. There are several 
factors contributing to this success of EMAS. In my view some of these influencing 
factors can be attributed to the specific institutional setting in Germany, whilst others 
might be generalised as potentials or structures of opportunities which might foster 
an implementation of European forms of indirect regulation at national or even 
regional levels. 
Turning to the institutional factors which influenced the EMAS-implementation in 
Germany above all German (environmental) law and its law culture are to be taken 
account of. The German environmental law culture can be described by a regulatory 
approach which underscores strict-non-flexible standards, legal compliance, 
monitoring and law enforcement by public authorities as well as an “engineer-driven” 
understanding of environmental problems and their possible solutions. This engineer-
driven perspective on the environment is reflected in some basic, i.e. implicit 
assumptions about dealing with environmental problems which are in most cases 
neither debated nor reflected publicly (cf. Schein 2003). These assumptions rest on 
the idea that environmental problems triggered by economic activities are problems 
to be solved by technology. Therefore, in German environmental law references to 
the actual state of technology and technical guidelines, such as e.g. the TA Luft 
1986, play an important role (cf. Héritier et al. 1994; Lulofs 2001). Combined with this 
‘technological fix’ is the idea to combat environmental problems by setting limit values 
of pollutants as a demand to companies. Higher environmental limit values require at 
least in the middle or in the long run more advanced technology to be introduced by 
firms if they do not want to violate legal environmental standards. Therefore, more 
ambitious limit values combined with controls by public authorities are important 
means to push companies to introduce environmentally safer technologies which are 
                                                 
8  The frontrunner position of Germany relates to the absolute numbers of sites registered under EMAS. The 
General Directorate for the Environment provides interesting statistical data which limit this frontrunner position 
of Germany. If the number of organisations registered under EMAS by country is weighted per one million 
inhabitants then Austria reaches the pole position with 36.65 registered organisations per one million inhabitants. 
The second rank goes to Germany with ca. 27 validated organisations per one million inhabitants followed by 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway (see the EU-website quoted before).  
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to lead to a reduction of environmental pollution. In the German culture of 
environmental law technology is regarded as a main problem solver or remedy to 
environmental problems induced by companies and utilisation of technology which 
negated environmental impacts of production.  
In companies this law culture fosters an organisational push of environmental 
protection (Schwaderlapp 1999: 96) characterised by a legally obliged establishment 
of environmental representatives in firms which might be relevant polluters to the 
environment. These representatives are to control emissions and pollutants and are 
to support the top management of a firm to ensure compliance with environmental 
law. Moreover, firms with a higher potential of environmental pollution or impacts also 
have to report regularly to public authorities and to inform public authorities or law 
enforcement agencies in good time about changes in their organisation of 
environmental protection or the planned establishment of new works or plants which 
then according to environmental laws have to be approved by public authorities.  
The culture of environmental law in Germany fostered in at least two ways a 
distribution of EMAS as an instrument of indirect regulation: Firstly, the EMAS-
regulation confronted the public authorities as well as companies in Germany with a 
new approach on environmental protection which was until then alien to the 
prevailing culture of law and to in-company structures of environmental protection. 
This new approach consisted in the establishment of environmental management 
systems as a means of company-related self-organisation or self-regulation in 
respect to environmental matters. Without any precursors of environmental 
management systems in Germany, as e.g. the BS 7750 in the United Kingdom, 
EMAS and its environmental management system were taken up by environmentally 
oriented companies after the launch of EMAS in Germany. During the early years of 
EMAS there hardly existed any competitive environmental management standard in 
Germany. Secondly, the German law culture fostered in many larger and even in 
medium-sized companies a relative high level of environmental protection. EMAS 
offered to these firms an opportunity to utilise their high internal level of 
environmental protection as a competitive edge: For instance, EMAS was regarded 
as a means to improve stakeholder relations. Moreover, the high level of 
environmental protection reduced costs related to the implementation of 
environmental management systems and procedures. In companies which embraced 
a high level of in-company environmental protection efforts to attain EMAS-
registration were comparatively lower than in firms with lower internal standards of 
environmental protection. Until the mid 1990ies the German environmental law did 
hardly provide any economic incentives to firms with a high level of environmental 
performance.  
Comparing experience of the EMAS-implementation in different member states, i.e. 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, Frank Wätzold and 
Alexandra Bültmann (2001: 151 pp.) provide some explanations for the German pole 
position on EMAS, which also might serve as principles of ‘good practise’ for indirect 
regulation by the example of EMAS. First of all, the authors attribute the surprising 
German success to the specific system of accreditation, supervision and registration 
which emerged as contingent outcome of political dispute9. The compromise solution 
                                                 
9 The conflict focussed on the degree of influence industry or business associations were to exert on this system. 
The Federal Environment Ministry (FEM) and environmental interest groups were opposed to business 
associations and another German ministry, the Federal Ministry of Trade and Industry (FMTI) (cf. 
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ensured as well political influence of public authorities as of non-governmental 
interest groups, such as business associations, trade unions and environmental 
organisations on the German system of accreditation and supervision of verifiers and 
registration of companies under EMAS. Because of their key role in the German 
system of EMAS-implementation the involved business federations were strongly 
interested in EMAS becoming a story of success, i.e. in high rates of company 
participation in EMAS. This also counts for the chambers of crafts and the chambers 
of industry and commerce as bodies of registrations. The influence which is 
guaranteed to business federations on the German system of EMAS-implementation 
did not only enhance their commitment and promotion in favour of EMAS among their 
members. It also underscored a trustworthy image or at least an acceptance of 
EMAS on the side of companies as members of business federations. 
In member states, in which national business federations was denied an important 
role in the establishment of the EMAS-implementation system, the rate of 
participating firms was comparatively moderate. This especially counts for France 
with its tradition of political centralisation. In France the EMAS-system was 
dominated by the French Ministry of the Environment, which also functions as the 
competent body for EMAS. French business associations and companies rejected 
the strong influence of the ministry on the system of accreditation, supervision and 
registration. Therefore, the confidence of firms in EMAS was relatively low conveyed 
in minor rates of EMAS-participation. 
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn, that EMAS as an indirect European 
regulation also requires a balancing of interests at the national level, especially with 
regard to the design and the establishment of federal implementation systems. If 
EMAS-systems at national levels reflect a balance of interests the probability of a 
broad support of indirect regulation is enhanced because different interests are taken 
account of. It also stimulates a support of EMAS by different political or social actors 
which are involved in the EMAS-system. Although such a balancing of interests at the 
federal level is an important prerequisite for the effectiveness of European indirect 
                                                                                                                                                        
Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 151 pp.). At the time of the conflict Germany was governed by a coalition of 
conservative and liberal parties. The latter was in charge of the ministry of trade and industry. The FEM opted 
for a strong influence of public authorities on the German system of accreditation, supervision and registration in 
order to enhance the social credibility and acceptance of the system. Therefore, the FEM proposed the Federal 
Environmental Agency (FEA) as the core institution of the planned system. In order to gain the support or at 
least acceptance of business associations the FEM preferred an agreement with all involved interest groups. The 
FMTI acted mainly as governmental supporter of business interests and associations and intended to minimise 
the influence of public authorities on the system. In this view the system was to take account of business 
interests and to set incentives for an EMAS-registration of companies. The involved business associations were 
interested in a system being in charge of business organisations and rejected any public intervention. In the end 
the dispute was resolved by compromise in 1995: The new system rests on several pillars. A new organisation or 
body for the accreditation of environmental verifiers was founded. In legal terms it is a company of limited 
liability by German business associations. The FEM exerts a monitoring or supervisory function on this newly 
created body of accreditation, mainly directed to ensure legal compliance of its actions and decisions. In order to 
support as well as to control the body of accreditation a second new pillar was established: the environmental 
verifiers’ committee. Members of this committee are mainly representatives of different interest groups and 
political or administrative actors, such as environmental NGOs, trade unions, business organisations and 
representatives of the FEA. The function of registration bodies is exercised by the chambers of industry and 
commerce for industrial organisations or by the chambers of crafts. The registration procedure requires the 
chambers to inform relevant public enforcement authorities about company applications for registration. If these 
public authorities do not interfere, i.e. in case of legal compliance with environmental law by applicants, the 
registration of a company will be accepted.      
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regulation the influence of the political culture of single European member states has 
to be taken into consideration. For instance, a balancing of different interests can be 
better accomplished in a political culture of corporatism, in which the state acts more 
or less as mediator and moderator of interests and different interests groups are 
consulted in processes of policy making, than in political cultures to which a stronger 
participation of interest groups is alien to, as e.g. in a political culture of etatism, as 
e.g. in France (cf. Visser 1996).   
Another prerequisite of a successful implementation of EMAS at the national level are 
enhanced promotional activities by different interests groups or actors supporting 
EMAS. The German case illustrates that such a differentiated promotion of EMAS 
creates a higher awareness of EMAS among companies of different sizes and 
branches. In Germany, especially the federal and regional governments as well as 
their affiliated public agencies and the chambers of commerce and industry or the 
chambers of crafts promoted the EMAS-system (Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 154). The 
promotion contained information and advice to companies. Nevertheless, promotional 
activities are necessary but not sufficient to increase the participation rates of firms in 
the EMAS-system.   
Barriers to EMAS-participation can be lifted if (additional) incentives to firms are 
offered which are directly linked with EMAS-participation. Contrary to other European 
member states the incentives for EMAS-participation of firms rested on two pillars in 
Germany: They embraced financial subsidies as well as a preferential treatment with 
regard to regulatory relief. According to Wätzold and Bültmann (2001) by estimations 
between 30 per cent and 60 per cent of firms participating in EMAS obtained 
subsidies. These subsidies were often granted as an indirect financial support. For 
example, the federal and also several regional governments launched initiatives to 
attract companies to the EMAS-system. These initiatives included among other 
measures pilot projects directed to the implementation of EMAS in firms related to 
specific industrial core sectors or branches, as e.g. in the German state Northrhine 
Westphalia. Firms being interested in EMAS were invited to participate in these pilot 
projects. The pilot projects also involved environmental consultants who provided 
firms with expertise and advice to establish an environmental management system 
according to EMAS. The costs related to environmental consultancy were financed 
by the federal or regional governments. Financial incentives were also linked with 
governmental innovation programs at the federal or regional level. For example, in 
some German states employment programs co-financed by the European Social 
Funds, as e.g. the Northrhine Westphalian programme QUATRO, were opened up to 
environmental management as a relevant field of in-company innovation. These 
programmes were especially tailored to medium-sized and smaller companies.  
German business associations and chambers of commerce and industry were in 
favour of regulatory relief for firms participating in EMAS. Most of the German states 
which are in charge of environmental monitoring, licensing and legal enforcement, 
answered to these demands of partial deregulation with different measures of 
regulatory relief limited to EMAS-participants. For example, such measures contained 
fewer external controls of EMAS-registered companies by enforcement agencies (as 
also practised in France) or the substitution of control duties and documentation and 
reporting requirements by in-company mechanisms of self-control and documentation 
related to EMAS. A more ambitious attempt to environmental deregulation was 
practised in the German state Bavaria on grounds of a concerted action between the 
Bavarian industry and the government (Wätzold/Bültmann 2001: 154-155). The 
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negotiated “Bavarian Environmental Pact” is based on the guiding principle of 
providing regulatory relief for an improved environmental performance of companies. 
The pact also included a specific agreement on EMAS: The state of Bavaria granted 
lighter regulatory relief and financial subsidies for the introduction of EMAS and 
environmentally oriented new technologies under the prerequisite that 500 sites were 
registered under EMAS until October 2000. The regulatory relief for EMAS-
participants rested on the principle of functional equivalence which stated that 
company-related measures as substitutes of legal reporting and monitoring duties 
had to be comparable in quality and scope but not identical with the until then 
required duties. The regulatory relief offered by German public authorities and state-
governments turned out to be incentives in order to increase the number of 
companies participating in EMAS. The relief was limited to ensure a high level of 
legal environmental standards in Germany. Notwithstanding, the concept of 
deregulation related to EMAS also provoked resentment arguing that regulatory relief 
might undermine existing legal environmental standards and abolish regular external 
controls of firms participating in EMAS (cf. Lübbe-Wolf 1998). 
The examples of financial subsidies and granted regulatory relief illustrate that an 
effective implementation of environmental policy instruments which rest on the 
concept of indirect regulation requires an activating and supporting role of states or 
governments and its affiliated public agencies and authorities at the national level as 
well as at the regional level. 
  
7. EMAS-Implementation at the Establishment Level   
Turning to the impact assessment of the EMAS-implementation at the establishment 
level by the example of Germany I will refer to EMAS I compiling core results of 
different, but mainly quantitative evaluation studies carried out in Germany 
supplemented by research results of qualitative case studies. Further and detailed 
descriptions of several studies, their methodology and survey methods are not 
delivered in this paper, but can be obtained from the quoted studies. German 
evaluation studies referring to EMAS II have not been published yet. My secondary 
cross-over analysis on EMAS-implementation at the plant level is structured by two 
focal points of reference: Firstly, the external effects of EMAS on firms are examined. 
Secondly, an evaluation of the internal effects of the EMAS-implementation is 
provided which focuses on an ecological modernisation of firms.   
The results of my secondary cross-over analysis refer to EMAS I, i.e. the end of the 
1990ies. At that time 2085 sites were registered under EMAS in Germany (December 
1998). The distribution of registered sites illustrates that focal branches in EMAS-
implementation existed. The highest EMAS-participation was observed in chemical 
industry (216 sites), followed by steel and metal industry (204 sites), food industry 
(197 sites) and mechanical engineering (153 sites). Moreover, 56 establishments in 
retail trade were registered under EMAS I.10  
                                                 
10 An extension of EMAS to the entirety of branches or industries and organisations was accomplished after the 
revised EMAS II was adopted in 2001. Since then such diverse organisations as universities (cf. Bogun 2004; 
Bastenhorst et al. 2000), production plants, hospitals and construction firms or local administrations are 
registered under EMAS.  
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Most of the branches with a relatively high number of EMAS-sites share one or two 
common features: An EMAS-participation seems to be attractive for establishments 
related to industries with a high potential of environmental damage or a higher 
degree of environmental impacts, as e.g. the chemical and the metal industry. Such 
EMAS-sites display a high sensitivity to environmental concerns. They expect EMAS 
to save costs in materials, resources and energy as well as to improve environmental 
communication with stakeholders. Moreover, EMAS became attractive to sites which 
adhered to branches marked by a production of goods for private consumers and 
related services. In these industries environmental aspects are often closely linked 
with health aspects, as e.g. in food industry and retail trade. Therefore, these sites 
expect from EMAS to enhance their competitiveness by emphasising their roles as 
frontrunners in environmental and health related respects. 
In EMAS-participation size matters: Environmental management systems according 
to EMAS were mainly introduced by larger companies with a high potential of 
environmental damage. EMAS proved to be a ‘success story’ among larger 
companies in Germany because 82 per cent of large companies with an annual 
turnover of 255.65 million € had established an environmental management system 
in 1997, mainly on the basis of EMAS (cf. Fichter 2000: 13). Smaller firms or 
establishments with less than 100 employees are underrepresented in EMAS-
participation. Compared to their share among the entirety of industry, which is about 
52 per cent in Germany, only 22.6 per cent of smaller establishments participated in 
EMAS (Heinelt/Malek 1999: 550-551). These statistical figures hint at barriers to an 
EMAS-implementation in smaller companies, which are dealt with later in this paper. 
7.1 External Effects of EMAS-Participation 
An evaluation of EMAS-implementation at the company or establishment level has to 
take account of internal and external effects. External effects refer to different social 
or economic environments EMAS-participants are embedded in or related to, such as 
customers, neighbours and other stakeholders, public authorities and markets. 
Internal effects are related to the in-company impacts of EMAS-implementation as far 
as they can precisely attributed to. Summarising the economic benefits of EMAS-
participation at the company or site level managers appreciate above all the internal 
effects of EMAS-participation, such as cost reductions, employee motivation and 
environmental awareness and transparency of tasks and responsibilities in in-
company environmental management, whilst high hopes in positive external effects, 
as e.g. improved relationships to customers, public authorities, banking and 
insurance companies or competitive advantages, were mainly disappointed (cf. 
Dyllick 1999; Becke 1999).  
Several studies on the EMAS-implementation in Germany emphasised the negative 
external effects of EMAS. This result is remarkable because many managers opted 
for EMAS-participation because of their high hopes to benefit from EMAS in 
stakeholder-relations. The effects of EMAS on the social reputation of firms and their 
external environmental communication are at least ambiguous. On the one hand 
managers or environmental representatives interviewed in studies about the EMAS-
implementation at the site-level expressed their opinion that EMAS contributed to a 
better public image of the establishment and to an improvement of environmental 
communication enhancing the environmental commitment of the firm. This especially 
was attributed to the environmental statement (cf. Weber 1998: 24). This result 
contrasts with several other studies which illustrate that there was hardly an interest 
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in the environmental statements on the side of neighbours to firms or the local public. 
Moreover, even social and environmental interest groups showed little or no interest 
in environmental statements (cf. Höppner et. al. 1998; Dyllick/Hamschmidt 1999). 
Several studies show that the relations of establishments with public authorities or 
legal enforcement agencies have not improved since the day sites were registered 
under EMAS; regulatory relief was seldom granted (cf.  FEU 1998: 11; UNI/ASU 
1997: 7). Even one in ten EMAS-participants was confronted with additional controls 
by legal enforcement agencies after having successfully passed the EMAS-
requirements (cf. ibid.; Steger 2000: 476). This result can mainly be attributed to the 
low level of information on the side of local enforcement agencies about EMAS after 
EMAS started in Germany. High attention towards EMAS-sites was only paid to by 
universities and environmental consultants. The negative reaction of the public to 
EMAS-registered sites is underlined by the same experience of firms in other 
member states of the European Union (Wätzold/Bültmann 2001). This problem hints 
at a demand for a more co-ordinated approach of EMAS-promotion between the 
levels of the European Union and its member states. Therefore, the revision of EMAS 
in 2001 was linked with a promotion campaign and a new logo of EMAS. It remains to 
be seen whether this campaign is a solution to the problem or rather a solution 
addressed to the wrong problem.  
In my view the lack of public attention to EMAS reflects that one of the basic 
assumptions of EMAS as an instrument of indirect regulation turns out to be 
inappropriate. Political promoters of EMAS state that consumers or citizens of the 
European Union should have a full or at least a maximum of transparency of all 
relevant information for their economic action. Therefore, the publication of registered 
EMAS-sites is to create such a transparency in order to reward environmentally 
oriented firms by an increased sale of their products by European consumers or 
citizens. Behind the image of the responsible citizen or consumer an environmentally 
oriented version of the neo-classical model of the ‘homo oeconomicus’ can be 
detected. Having transparency on all relevant information consumers can decide 
rationally in favour of goods or services provided by EMAS-sites. There are some 
assumptions which are to be criticised with regard to this model: Firstly, the model 
and its related assumptions neither take enough account of the social diversity of 
consumers within the European Union nor do they take into consideration that even 
consumer decisions are embedded in social contexts people live in, as e.g. social 
milieus, or people display, as e.g. different life styles. The assumption of rational 
decision-making in consumption negates the complex nature of human beings, 
especially their emotional quality and their relevance to processes of decision-making 
(cf. Fineman 2003). Moreover, the promotion activities of EMAS on the European 
level and national levels are mainly directed to a specific part of the public, i.e. the 
economic public (Freimann 2001: 7). The economic public is to be attracted to 
increase participation numbers of EMAS, whilst information on EMAS provided for 
different target groups of European citizens were scarce.  
Moreover, EMAS confronts single establishments with demands of an environmental 
dialogue with different stakeholders and citizens. Especially small and medium-sized 
businesses (SME) are often overcharged to cope with these demands lacking 
personnel resources for such a task. The publication or distribution of the 
environmental statement is insufficient and too passive as a means of communication 
to address a diverse public. A solution to this problem of external communication may 
consist in the development of networks on the levels of branches and regions 
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providing SME with support in the implementation of EMAS and an environmental 
dialogue with different target groups (cf. Glasze/Zöllner 1998). 
The expectations of managers to gain benefits from EMAS in terms of a better 
market-performance or competitiveness were partly disappointed. Until now EMAS 
did not turn out to be a “voluntary force” (Miller 1997: 156) in the case of inviting 
entries for public commissions, as e.g. by local public authorities, in which EMAS-
registered sites might be preferred to competitors who had not participated in EMAS. 
Unlike systems of quality management the EMAS-registration is not regarded as a 
necessary prerequisite of suppliers co-operating with larger companies, though an 
EMAS-registration improves the evaluation of suppliers in German automobile 
industry. In the banking and insurance sector a preferential treatment of EMAS-
registered sites only sometimes occurred (cf. Weber 1998; Höppner et al. 1998), 
though banks in the meantime regard an EMAS-registration as an indicator of low 
environmental risks (Miller 1997). It remains to be seen whether an economic 
evaluation of firms on grounds of the Basel II-agreement will be linked with better 
credit conditions for firms which established an EMS according to EMAS.  
In most of the empirical EMAS-studies it is underscored that the participation in 
EMAS enhanced the legal environmental compliance of the involved establishments 
(cf. FEU 1998; Weber 1998; ASU/UNI 1997; DGB Bildungswerk 1997). This result 
can be attributed to the detection and removal of environmental defects in 
environmental reviews and audits (cf. Ankele et al. 1998: 41). Moreover, gaps of 
knowledge in respect to legal environmental provisions and laws being valid and 
relevant to a specific site were overcome. The positive evaluation of the improved 
legal compliance by interviewed managers or environmental representatives also 
reflects their specific focus of environmental action which is directed to efforts which 
ensure legal compliance. This strong orientation on legal compliance partly absorbs 
initiative to foster a continuous environmental improvement process (Weber 1998: 
39). It also conveys that German managers and environmental representatives are 
still accustomed to the ‘command and control’ approach of German environmental 
policy.  To put it in a nutshell the disappointment of management with low external 
effects of EMAS-registration explains why even in Germany the development of 
EMAS-participation stagnates or slows down and participation-rates in ISO 14001 
rise simultaneously in all European countries. If EMAS fails to gain positive effects in 
communication with different stakeholders, then efforts and costs to publish an 
environmental statement are regarded as avoidable. In this view a shift from EMAS- 
to ISO 14001-participation seems to pay off for environmentally committed 
establishments. 
7.2 Internal Effects of EMAS-Participation               
First of all, the internal effects of EMAS-participation refer to the economic relation of 
costs and benefits, environmental performance, the design of environmental 
management as a continuous process of improvement and employee involvement.  
Secondly, in-company processes of EMAS-introduction are examined in respect to 
innovative potentials for organisational learning and a further ecological 
modernisation of companies. 
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The economic relation of costs and benefits 
The cost-benefit-ratio of EMS according to EMAS is limited in respect to its 
measurement:  Some of the cost relevant potentials, such as employee motivation 
and the public image of registered companies, consist of ‘soft factors’ which evade a 
quantitative measurement.  Moreover, middle-range or long-term potentials cannot 
be forecasted after some years of EMAS being in practise (cf. Steger 2000: 474).  
Managers expected – among other aspects – that the EMAS-participation would pay 
off and additional potentials of cost reduction would be exhausted. This expectation 
ranked high among German managers whose firms participated in EMAS. A 
quantitative study carried out by the agency of education and training of the German 
trade union congress among works councils and environmental representatives or 
managers of EMAS-registered sites, which mainly belonged to the metal industry, 
showed that nearly 50 per cent of the interviewed managers or environmental 
representatives of EMAS-sites stated that expected economic benefits were a main 
motivation to participate in EMAS (DGB Bildungswerk 1997). 
According to another EMAS-study financed by an employer association the average 
in-company costs of an in-establishment EMAS-introduction was about 80.340 €; 60 
per cent of the entire costs were attributed to internal factors (UNI/ASU 1997: 25). 
However, one has to take into consideration that the actual costs of implementation 
differed strongly in dependence from the size of establishments and of the level of 
environmental protection before EMAS was introduced to a site. For example, the 
average costs for small companies with less than 100 employees amounted to 2.500 
up to 5.000 €. Especially small and medium-sized businesses are confronted with 
comparatively higher costs of the EMAS-introduction than larger establishments.  
Because of an often very limited range of personnel and a lack of know how in 
building up an environmental management system, smaller firms were highly 
dependent on cost-inducing environmental consultancy (cf. Weber 1998: 33-34; 
Dyllick 1999: 119). Costs induced by external consultation amount up to 
approximately 25.000 € for more than every second of the smaller firms being 
registered under EMAS (Seidel/Weber 1998: 24). The average entire costs of EMAS-
participation related to firms with less than 20 employees were about 34.5000 € 
(Freimann 1998: 75).   Moreover, costs for registration fees and environmental 
verifiers proved to be a stronger financial burden to small firms than to larger ones. 
The time span of EMAS-amortisation decreases with the size of companies 
(Seidel/Weber 1998). Information on costs in respect to the administration of 
environmental management systems is not available in studies on the EMAS or ISO 
14001 implementation at the site or company level (Dyllick 1999: 119). 
In most cases the EMAS-introduction paid off, at least in the short run. After an 
average time span between ten and 15 month costs were balanced by economic 
benefits (cf. UNI/ASU 1997; Höppner et al. 1998). Costs were mainly reduced in 
waste reduction and disposal, energy saving and in the usage of water and sewage 
(UNI/ASU 1997: 35). In several studies dealing with the introduction of EMAS the 
interviewed managers or environmental representatives expected additional cost 
reductions by a further development of the environmental management or the 
continuous environmental improvement process in the middle or long run. In several 
EMAS-studies only the quantitative costs and benefits were asked for, neglecting that 
so-called soft factors may in a longer run also pay off, as e.g. an improved 
environmental awareness of employees (cf. Weber 1998: 33; UNI/ASU 1997: 35-36). 
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However, mangers did not expect higher than average cost reductions. This 
scepticism related to further cost reductions may be explained by the prevailing 
character of environmental protection in German firms which is marked by an 
application of end-of-the-pipe technologies rather than integrated and 
environmentally more efficient technologies (Dyckhoff/Jacobs 1994: 720). If 
managers rely on established end-of-the-pipe-technologies the potentials of more 
innovative forms of production technology combined with EMS will hardly be 
exhausted. Another explanation might arise from their scepticism whether the efforts 
to achieve a continuous improvement of environmental performance will be efficient. 
As far as I know there do not exist any empirical findings on the site-related cost-
benefit-relations of EMAS in a longer perspective. Last but not least, the negative 
external impacts of EMAS influence managers’ cost-benefit ratio (cf. Steger 2000): If 
costs related to the environmental statement or declaration do not pay off in improved 
stakeholder relations or competitive advantages, EMAS will then lose its attraction. 
The rinsing numbers of companies which eschew a renewal of EMAS in favour of an 
EMS-certification according to the ISO 14001 standard reflect the fragility of this cost-
benefit-ratio.    
Environmental performance 
The level of environmental protection improved strongly and contributed to a partly 
remarkable reduction of site-related impacts on the environment in EMAS-registered 
sites. Often potentials of environmental improvements were detected in the course of 
the environmental review. Above all, environmental measures referred to technical 
improvements of machinery and production processes and the substitution of 
hazardous substances being harmful both to the environment and human beings. A 
reduction of environmental impacts concentrated mostly on the prevention and 
reduction of waste, followed by savings in the usage of water and sewage, energy 
savings and a reduction of emissions improving resource efficiency (cf. UNI/ASU 
1997; Höppner et al. 1998; Dyllick 1999). However, these environmental 
improvements related to the introduction of EMAS did not initiate a fundamental 
change from an end-of-the-pipe oriented environmental protection to an integrated 
approach of in-company environmental management. Nevertheless, the EMAS-
implementation partly enhanced the in-company level of reflection and dialogue as a 
platform for further steps to ecological modernisation, as e.g. a company-related 
mobility management or an environmentally oriented product design (cf. 
Heinelt/Töller 1999; UNI/ASU 1997). To sum up, the implementation of EMAS might 
not make a qualitative difference compared to environmental performance outcomes 
of the regulatory approach (Freimann 2001: 8). This also counts for ISO 14001 
because their environmental performance is not distinguishable from EMAS (ibid). 
Moreover, there exists no empirical evidence that firms participating in EMAS set 
more ambitious environmental goals than before (Dyllick 1999: 121). The introduction 
of EMAS at the establishment level focused mainly on environmental improvements 
related to the site, rarely taking account of services and products. This limited 
environmental scope can partly be attributed to the legal provision of EMAS I which 
excluded products.11 The ecological effectiveness between EMS according to ISO 
14001 and to EMAS did not differ at the site level, which undermined EMAS-
                                                 
11 The exclusion of products may lead to paradoxical situations: Taking part in an international trade union 
meeting on the environment in Liege in 1998 I learned that managers of Belgian nuclear power plants prepared 
to have their site-related EMS validated in accordance with EMAS.  
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promoters’ emphasis on the more ambitious environmental character of EMAS (ibid: 
122).          
7.3 Ecological Modernisation of Firms via EMAS? 
The introduction of EMAS initiated partly processes of ecological modernisation in 
establishments. It modernised and improved the environmental protection in 
participating firms. The environmental management system contributed to establish 
or improve an organisational structure and procedures to integrate environmental 
aspects in in-company operational and even decision-making processes. In three out 
of four validated sites the relevance of environmental criteria in decision-making 
processes was enhanced (DGB-Bildungswerk 1997). Managers took on their 
environmental responsibility, i.e. environmental management became a task of the 
top management of establishments. Although introductory process of EMAS rested 
mainly on the shoulders of top-management, environmental or quality representatives 
and in-company production units (Weber 1998: 29), the range of in-company-
participants was broadened in two out of four sites registered under EMAS by the 
establishment of steering committees on environmental management (DGB 
Bildungswerk 1997). Besides environmental improvements and an enhanced legal 
compliance the transparency of internal responsibilities, tasks and procedures was 
increased (Seidel/Weber 1998). Moreover, instruments of environmental 
management, as e.g. regular internal audits, were applied in more than 80 per cent of 
the registered sites (UNI/ASU 1997).  
Nevertheless, the introduction of EMAS often did not trigger processes of an 
advanced ecological modernisation of firms. There are several barriers to implement 
a more ambitious concept of ecological modernisation which are to be taken account 
of: Firstly, the range of environmental management is limited in regard to its strategic 
meaning as well as to its scope. Although the environmental responsibility of 
managers is emphasised and the importance of environmental criteria is reinforced in 
decision-making processes environmental aspects are often neither (equally) 
integrated in the core business nor a constituent of the company strategy (cf. 
Freimann 2001; Birke 2003; Dyllick 1999, Schmidt 2004). For example, 
environmental management systems are hardly regarded as a platform for more 
innovative and inventive forms of management, as e.g. an enlargement of the 
strategic scope of companies towards an integration of environmental aspects in 
supply-chain-relationships or product policy in order to take competitive advantages 
of environmental management. Another innovative step might be the establishment 
of stakeholder dialogues in which stakeholders are recognised as contributors to 
solve environmental problems of firms instead of limiting external communication to 
the publication of environmental statements. Moreover, the implementation of EMAS 
is often closely linked with the improvement of an environmental protection-level 
focused on end-of-the-pipe solutions neglecting advanced options of environmental 
management and the application of pollution preventive technologies.      
Secondly, an ecological modernisation via EMAS-participation is restricted in many 
companies because options to initiate processes of environmental and organisational 
learning are not or hardly exhausted (cf. Meier 2002; Becke 2004; Brentel 2001). 
Organisational learning can be defined as “the process in which organisations 
acquire knowledge, integrate it in their knowledge base and re- or newly organise it 
for future solutions of problems” (Schreyögg 1998: 538), i.e. organisational learning 
rests on restructuring the organisational knowledge base. In order to integrate 
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knowledge in the organisational knowledge base it has to be collectively accepted as 
crucial to the organisation. In this view organisational learning requires collectively 
shared and accepted knowledge (Dirks et al. 2002).  
The implementation of EMAS illustrates in several ways restrictions to an 
environmental and organisational learning: The legal institutionalization of 
environmental representatives compulsory to companies being relevant polluters to 
the environment has at least an ambivalent impact on organisational learning and 
ecological modernisation. The build up of an environmental management system and 
the preparation for validation is often delegated by the top-management of 
establishments to these functional, highly qualified experts. On the one hand 
environmental representatives often act as promoters and ‘net-workers’ in 
environmental management initiating processes of environmental improvement and 
innovation. Therefore, they can stimulate organisational learning in respect to 
environmental matters. On the other hand, their orientation of action is often directed 
to ensure legal environmental compliance. They often regard environmental 
problems mainly as technical problems because of their professional socialisation as 
engineers or technicians. This especially counts for full-time environmental 
representatives in medium-sized or larger companies. EMAS enhances the 
significance of expert knowledge because it creates an increased demand of expert 
knowledge: auditable facts, data, management structures and environmental 
evaluation criteria are necessary for an effective operation as well as an external 
control of the EMAS-management system (cf. Power 1997). Companies have to build 
up such expert knowledge on their own or become more dependent on 
environmental consultants. Functional experts with such an action orientation of 
technological rationality12 prefer technical solutions to environmental problems. They 
often negate the organisational, social or behavioural dimension of these problems 
(cf. Becke 2003: 48). Therefore, this preferential technical treatment of environmental 
matters by environmental representatives or environmental departments restricts 
opportunities of organisational environmental learning. Technological rationality can 
prevent functional experts from integrating employees in environmental management. 
Hence it follows, that employees’ tacit skills and knowledge are only marginally 
involved in environmental management.  
In Germany small and medium-sized businesses with less severe potentials of 
environmental impacts often appoint environmental representatives voluntarily. 
Functional experts in small businesses face a different situation in respect to EMAS-
implementation: They often work only part-time as environmental representatives. 
Therefore, they have to balance demands from at least two different jobs. In order to 
cope with these demands they often concentrate their environmental activities on the 
build up and the further development of an environmental management system 
according to EMAS and on ensuring legal compliance. These part-time 
environmental representatives often lack time resources necessary for initiating 
further environmental innovations or a stronger involvement of employees (Becke et 
al. 1997). Unlike functional experts in larger establishments they often can hardly 
count on support by internal networks because the small number of employees is 
often absorbed by regular workaday job activities (Grüneberg et al. 1997: 41). 
                                                 
12 In recent years training modules were developed and tested successfully to enhance the social competence of 
functional environmental experts and to sensitize them for the social process of organisational and environmental 
change in companies (cf. Becke et al. 2000).  
 41
Therefore, options of combining the EMAS-implementation with processes of 
organisational learning are only partly realized. 
Thirdly, organisational environmental learning via EMAS is restricted by the strong 
impact of the regulatory approach on the administration of environmental 
management in German firms. The strong impact of the German environmental law 
culture and its dominant regulatory approach often create an imbalance between 
activities ensuring legal compliance on the one hand and environmental 
improvements and learning on the other hand. Although EMAS provides an excellent 
opportunity structure to combine legal compliance with continuous environmental 
improvement and learning at the site level, functional experts and managers often 
give priority to attain or enhance legal compliance and to comply with EMAS-
prerequisites instead of establishing EMAS as a platform for organisational and 
environmental learning and innovation (cf. Seidel/Weber 1998: 25). In Germany the 
close linkage of EMAS to legal compliance proves to be a brake on in-company 
ecological modernisation if in-company promoters of EMAS emphasise compliance 
with environmental law and define solely modest environmental goals.  
A forth potential restriction to an advanced in-company ecological modernisation 
rests on EMAS-implementation as a social process in which different in-company 
actors with specific interests are involved in. Introducing EMAS-EMS contains efforts 
to strengthen environmental goals and their attainment in firms. Moreover, it often 
includes at least a partial redistribution of diverse scarce in-company resources, 
above all financial resources and the social resources of power and recognition. If the 
introduction of EMAS is combined with e.g. a differentiated attribution of entire 
environmental costs to specific organisational units or departments, such efforts 
might alter the internal cost-situation of specific units and redefine economic criteria 
of success in respect to internal economic comparisons between different 
organisational units. Therefore, the implementation of EMAS at the establishment 
level turns often out to be a ‘contested terrain’, i.e. it is accompanied by conflicts and 
resistance of specific actors to EMAS which is regarded as a threat to their power 
position (cf. Klemisch/Rohn 2002: 21 p.)13. Therefore, an in-company definition of 
rather modest environmental goals can also be explained as a solution of 
compromise between different actors. The implementation of EMAS at the 
establishment level evokes resistance, if established workaday practises and routines 
are challenged which constitute a focal point of reliability and stability for in-company 
actors (cf. Becke et al. 2001; Brüggemann/Riehle 1995). For instance, construction 
workers, who worked for a firm consulted by some colleagues and me in respect to 
the implementation of an EMS at the end of the 1990ies, at first rejected EMS 
because they regarded it as a restriction of their work-related range of action and as 
interference in their work practises.   
Last but not least, organisational learning related to EMAS is restricted because 
employees are either rarely or marginally involved (cf. Klemisch/Rohn 2002: 25 pp.; 
Freimann1998: 75). At first sight such a statement seems amazing because several 
studies on EMAS-introduction to German establishments underscore that EMAS 
contributed to increased environmental motivation or awareness of employees (cf. 
UNI/ASU 1997; Heinelt/Töller 1999; Weber 1998). An increase in environmental 
motivation of employees can be explained by training measures offered to 
                                                 
13 The relevance of micro-political processes for an environmental modernisation of German companies was also 
illustrated in previous studies (cf. Birke/Schwarz 1994).  
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employees. These trainings enabled them to acquire ecological knowledge mainly 
related to their job or workplace and basic knowledge on EMAS (cf. DGB-
Bildungswerk 1997). Environmental trainings sensitised employees for site-related 
environmental problems and provided them with knowledge about ways and 
demands of environmentally oriented work behaviour. Moreover, the increased 
motivation may reflect a high level of environmental awareness of employees (cf. 
Bogun et al. 1990; Lange et al. 1995; Heine/Mautz 1989) who regard the EMAS-
implementation as a new structure of opportunity to take account of environmental 
concerns at the establishment level.       
At second sight several studies also observed that employees and even works 
councils were mainly involved in the introduction of EMAS by information and internal 
communication instead of forms of direct employee participation or co-determination 
by works councils. Two out of three employees of EMAS-sites were only involved by 
information, mainly resting on written information about EMAS, as e.g. the 
environmental statement or in-company newsletters. In 50 per cent of the EMAS-
sites employees were informed about EMAS by works or shop floor meetings. An 
active involvement of employees was mainly based on traditional systems of formal 
employee improvement proposals (Fichter 2000). Innovative forms of direct 
employee participation were only observed in ten to 20 per cent of EMAS-registered 
establishments (cf. ibid; DGB Bildungswerk 1997). These statistical figures illustrate 
that employees and their work-related tacit knowledge and creativity were seldom 
involved in the establishment of EMAS and in continuous environmental improvement 
processes14. Therefore, organisational learning in respect to environmental 
management focused mainly on functional experts and different levels of 
management involved in project teams or environmental steering committees. 
Organisational learning was reduced to “vicarious learning” (cf. Staehle 1999; Becke 
2004) often excluding employees. In larger companies this exclusion is often 
attributed to the definition of EMAS-implementation as a task of functional experts or 
managers. In smaller businesses, especially in traditional ones, an environmental 
participation of employees often fails because of a paternalistic leadership culture 
(Becke 2001): Employers’ self-understanding can be characterised as a ‘paternalistic 
shepherd’ acting on behalf of and in the ‘common interest’ of employees. Creating 
innovations is closely linked with the self-understanding as entrepreneur. In this 
perspective employees are not recognised as promoters of ecological modernisation 
or innovations.         
 
                                                 
14  However, in several projects dealing with the introduction of EMAS-EMS publicly co-financed, participative 
approaches, procedures and instruments, such as SAFE, i.e. ‘Sustainability Assessment for Enterprises’ (Rohn 
2003), were developed and tested successfully. These participative projects indicated that drawing on the skills, 
knowledge and motivation of employees proves to be a focal prerequisite for an ecological in-company 
modernisation via EMAS (cf. ibid, Becke et al. 2000).     
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8. Conclusion 
In summary EMAS turns out to be an ambivalent instrument of indirect regulation in 
respect to its internal and external impacts of firms which participated in EMAS 
voluntarily as well as in respect to the effects of EMAS on European environmental 
policy. A company-related assessment of EMAS demonstrates that EMAS enhanced 
the legal compliance of participants and increased partly the level of in-company 
environmental protection. Moreover, it contained an improvement of the 
environmental organisation structure of companies, i.e. the transparency of 
responsibilities and tasks in environmental management were increased. EMAS 
proved to be successful in respect to a publicly supervised self-regulation of firms by 
the establishment of a company-related environmental management. This especially 
refers to European member states, in which self-regulation via environmental 
management had not been practised before. Nevertheless, EMAS did seldom foster 
environmental innovations or an advanced ecological modernisation of firms: In 
member states with a legal culture dominated by the regulatory approach, as for 
instance Germany, emphasis was laid on legal compliance or meeting the formal 
requirements of the EMAS regulation instead of environmental innovations. Although 
EMAS embraces potentials of environmental organisational learning these potentials 
were not exhausted because environmental management was seldom linked with 
internal dialogues which involved and recognised employees and their knowledge 
and tacit skills as actors of environmental in-company improvements.  
In respect to stakeholder relations and competitiveness EMAS often proved to be a 
failure. This failure can be attributed to the construction of EMAS which on the one 
hand underestimated the social diversity of European consumer groups, as e.g. in 
respect to different life styles, adherence to social milieus, age groups, gender 
relations and income. On the other hand it overestimated the economy as part of the 
public sphere because the promotion of EMAS was mainly focused on economic 
actors neglecting social actors or target groups. Moreover, firms overestimated the 
effects of the published environmental statement on stakeholder relations. They often 
negated a discursive strategy in communicating their environmental performance. In 
respect to competitive advantages the participation in EMAS often did not pay off 
because the banking sector and insurance companies hardly appreciated the 
company participation in EMAS. Consumers did not increase their demand to 
products made by EMAS-participants. Public authorities granted only minor 
regulatory relief to firms registered under EMAS.            
In terms of a European wide distribution EMAS can also be regarded as a failure: 
Firstly, it is rather a German and Austrian than a European project. Secondly, EMAS 
was outweighed by its main competitor, i.e. the ISO 14001 standard of environmental 
management, in all member states of the European Union. Thirdly, compared to the 
circa ten million companies which exist in the European Union (Przybilski 1997: 37) 
the percentage of companies registered under EMAS remains marginal, i.e. less than 
one per cent (cf. Wätzold/Bültmann 2001). This tendency has yet not been altered by 
the revision of EMAS, i.e. EMAS II. However, EMAS was at least adopted by many 
larger companies or corporations. Therefore, it remains to be seen, whether these 
large companies will also expect their suppliers to introduce an environmental 
management system according to ISO 14001 or EMAS. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of EMAS in SMEs turned out to be an ‘Achilles’ Heel’. Therefore, the 
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increase of SME-participation in EMAS remains a future challenge to European 
environmental policy.       
EMAS is one of the core environmental policy instruments related to the ‘reflexive 
law’ or indirect regulation approach the European Union adopted in the 1990ies. This 
leads to the question whether EMAS as an instrument of indirect regulation achieved 
better results in environmental performance or outcomes in comparison with 
conventional instruments affiliated to the regulatory approach in European 
environmental policy. Taking account of the substantial environmental outcomes 
EMAS did not ensure a more ambitious environmental goal attainment than 
conventional regulatory instruments. In respect to its main competitor EMAS cannot 
be regarded as the more effective environmental standard. Although EMAS can be 
characterised as the tighter and more ambitious standard of environmental 
management both of the environmental standards, i.e. EMAS and ISO 14001, lead to 
similar environmental outcomes at the company or site level.  
Indirect regulation is often regarded as a means to overcome the defects of 
implementation related to regulatory instruments of European environmental policy. 
This ambitious expectation towards EMAS as a significant example of indirect 
regulation is disappointed. EMAS faced implementation problems similar to 
conventional regulatory instruments of European environmental policy: Firstly, the 
implementation of EMAS within the European Union was accompanied by 
considerable time-lags in the establishment of national bodies to adopt the EMAS 
regulation. Secondly, parallel policy processes interfered with EMAS. This especially 
counted for the competitive international policy scheme of the ISO 14001 standard 
(cf. Glachant 2001b). However, some general prerequisites of an improved 
implementation of EMAS could be identified. For instance, public financial incentives 
to SMEs can trigger an increased participation of such firms. Moreover, a balance of 
interests between different political, social and economic actors in respect to the 
national implementation of the EMAS-system proved to be as a key prerequisite of a 
broader support of EMAS.      
The revision of EMAS is an excellent example of policy learning at the European 
level. It illustrates that in a relative short period of time significant amendments to the 
EMAS regulation were adopted in order to sharpen its profile and to restructure its 
relationship to its main competitor. EMAS was redesigned as the high profile 
environmental management standard which enables firms a smooth transition from 
ISO 14001 as the ‘bottom-line’ standard to the advanced EMAS standard. Hereby, 
the pressure on EMAS to achieve a broad distribution within the European Union was 
reduced: It is not expected anymore that the majority of firms interested in 
environmental management are registered under EMAS as the superior, high profile 
environmental management standard. In this view quality counts more than quantity. 
Moreover, EMAS II contains starting points to overcome some severe defects of 
EMAS, such as the lack of employee participation. 
Finally, I would like to focus on some potentials of modernisation, which are directed 
to European environmental policy as well as to EMAS as a specific instrument of 
indirect environmental regulation.   
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8.1 The Modernisation of European Environmental Policy Structures 
Focusing on policy instruments or approaches might negate the institutional problems 
of policy implementation at the level of the European Union. If environmental policy 
instruments are related to direct or indirect regulation remains of secondary 
significance in relation to problems of environmental policy implementation which are 
attributed to the complex multi-level and multi-centred structure of the European 
policy system involving a variety of supranational, national and even regional and 
local political, economic or social actors.  
In my view the effectiveness of indirect and direct environmental policy regulation 
could be enhanced, if an environmental policy assessment of different European 
policies were fully established and integrated into different European policy fields. 
Moreover, an improved horizontal co-ordination between different fields of European 
policies could increase capacities of action to cope with unanticipated parallel policy 
processes or interactions which interfere with the implementation of European 
environmental policy (cf. Glachant 2000: 8). The enforcement of European 
environmental policy could be supported by concerted action among member states 
and a broader scope of political influence and sanction power on the side of 
European institutions to improve legal enforcement. However, this requires a further 
redistribution of political power to the European policy institutions. Therefore, it may 
trigger further conflicts between national political interests and European interests. 
With respect to indirect regulation national governments and its related agencies play 
a crucial role in policy implementation. First of all, they are responsible for 
establishing in due time the political or administrative infrastructure essential to the 
adoption of indirect environmental regulation at the national level. Secondly, national 
governments are confronted with demands to balance different social, political and 
economic interests to establish appropriate, consensus-based structures dealing with 
the implementation of indirect regulation. If national governments fail in negotiating a 
compromise of interests, a broad support of Environmental policy instruments of 
indirect regulation is questionable. Thirdly, the implementation of indirect 
Environmental regulation requires co-ordinated action between different levels of 
national, regional and local governments to create compatible opportunity structures, 
as e.g. publicly co-financed inter-company networks in environmental management. 
An important role of governments at the national, regional and local level consists in 
the creation of multi-actor network structures at each level whereby the 
implementation of Environmental policy instruments affiliated to indirect regulation 
can be promoted (cf. Becke 1999: 312). This may include e.g. spaces of dialogue on 
EMAS in the arena of local agenda 21 directed to SMEs or utilising different publicly 
co-funded programs to offer SMEs a low level entrance to EMAS. For instance, in 
some regions of the German federal state Northrhine Westphalia, as e.g. in a district 
called Märkischer Kreis, regional governments initiated regional agenda 21 
processes, in which smaller companies were offered the opportunity to join so-called 
external ‘group-audits’ in order to reduce costs related to the validation of EMAS-
EMS.15 Networks are not the remedy to solve problems of indirect regulation, but 
they may create a platform to balance different interests enabling a concerted 
support for an effective application of instruments of indirect regulation. Moreover, 
problems of indirect regulation can be reduced or at least better dealt with, if 
                                                 
15 A broad variety of proposals tailored to an enhanced EMAS-participation of smaller firms are provided by 
Klemisch and Rohn (2002: 32 p.). 
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communication strategies and resources to enhance the public awareness of 
environmentally committed firms and environmentally safe products take account of 
the diverse composition of ‘the public’ by means of differentiated communication 
strategies instead of a focus on the economic public.  
Although the effects of indirect regulation are limited with respect to EMAS this new 
approach should not be abolished but rather regarded as complementary to direct 
regulation. Both approaches are directed to sustain a relative high environmental 
standard at the European level. Complementing each other seems to be necessary 
because both approaches of regulation have different strength and defects. 
Therefore, an instrumental mix of different policy instruments may in the longer run 
prove to be more effective than a preferential application of either indirect regulation 
or direct regulation. On the one hand, the regulatory approach is still essential to 
European environmental policy in order to maintain a relative high environmental 
standard in Europe, which cannot be solely ensured by indirect regulation. Moreover, 
the regulatory approach proves to be a main driver of environmental investments and 
innovation at the level of companies or establishments. For instance, 90 per cent of 
investments related to environmental protection in German companies are induced 
by regulatory law (cf. Seidel/Weber 1998: 22). On the other hand, the regulatory 
approach offers hardly incentives to firms to improve their environmental 
performance voluntarily, leave alone to guarantee a high degree of legal 
enforcement. Therefore, the further development of this ‘instrumental mix’ of 
European environmental policy will be a future challenge to European environmental 
policy16. 
8.2 How to give fresh Impetus to EMAS-Participation?  
The core idea behind EMAS II consists of sharpening EMAS’ profile as a higher, i.e. 
more ambitious standard of environmental performance on grounds of controlled self-
regulation by firms, whilst ISO 14001 would be a minor, less ambitious standard. 
EMAS II acknowledges the EMS of ISO 14001 as a possible element of EMAS and 
offers firms certified under ISO 14001 options to join EMAS. Despite this strategic 
reorientation of EMAS as ‘standard of excellence’ it still faces stagnation or even a 
decline in numbers in most of the European Union member states17. The prospect of 
‘excellence’ proves to be an insufficient incentive to firms to participate in EMAS or to 
advance from ISO 14001 to EMAS. Therefore, debates on measures to increase the 
participation in EMAS linger on. A line of argumentation supports the idea to enhance 
                                                 
16 In this context an interesting proposals of an ‚instrumental mix’ in environmental policy is provided by 
Constanza et al.  (2001: 272 pp.): They propose a combination of different environmental policy instruments, in 
which a specific set of instruments is related to a certain levels of environmental quality or environmental health. 
In this perspective polluters are permitted to induce emissions without an obligation to pay environmental taxes, 
if these emissions remain within a legally defined area of emissions, in which they do not induce any measurable 
environmental damage. If polluters’ emissions cause measurable damages or pollution to the environment, they 
are liable to environmental taxation related to the pollutants concentration. The third set of environmental policy 
instruments consists of regulatory instruments. If polluters’ emission can cause irreversible long-term damage to 
the ecological system market-based instruments will be substituted by regulatory instruments.    
 
17 A turnaround in EMAS-participation seems to be rather unlikely taking account of preferences of companies 
in new member states of the European Union in central or eastern Europe: In some of these countries, such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic, EMAS is known to 90 per cent or 50 per cent of managers, but only one in ten 
planned to introduce an EMS according to EMAS in the middle range. In both countries a majority of managers 
(50 per cent to 65 per cent) preferred the ISO 14001 standard as basis for a future establishment of an EMS. This 
planned preferential treatment of ISO 14001 may be attributed to the fact that many firms had established before 
a quality management system according to the ISO 9000 series (cf. Kramer 1999: 158).    
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incentives to participating firms by offering forms of deregulation in legal 
environmental demands. Even if deregulation were the key to a strong increase in 
EMAS-participation, it would enclose an important side effect: The strategic position 
of  EMAS as environmental standard of excellence would be undermined. Then 
EMAS would suffer from a lack of social recognition losing its reputation. A second 
line of argumentation proposes to loosen the screws on EMAS-participants’ in 
respect to the requirement of continuous improvement of environmental performance 
(cf. Rau/Lange 2004: 11-13). In this perspective environmental management is 
subdivided into different stages: The first stage focuses on the introduction of an 
EMAS-EMS which also contains the achievement of goals fixed in the first 
environmental program. Then the second stage is entered. It embraces processes of 
monitoring internal and external demands to the EMAS-EMS, maintaining basic 
procedures, structures and information processes affiliated to EMAS, taking account 
of employees’ initiatives or proposals in environmental respect and communicating 
the attainment of goals to employees and external stakeholders. Processes of 
continuous improvement are substituted by processes of continual improvements 
which rest on specific projects defined by relevant in-company actors in decision-
making processes. To define a project is a core starting point to the third stage of 
continual improvement. A fresh impetus to start a new project may rest on altered 
internal or external demands, as e.g. new legal environmental norms or the 
introduction of new products to markets (ibid: 13). In the latter case a new project 
might e.g. contain the implementation on clean production technologies and an 
environmentally safe design of new products. This example illustrates that a structure 
of projects as backbone of continual improvements to environmental performance 
provides structures of opportunity to set ambitious environmental goals. In my view 
this approach would loosen the pressure of continuous environmental improvements 
to companies as well as enable companies to define ambitious environmental 
projects improving their environmental performance.    
In my opinion the barriers to participate in EMAS can also be lowered if a 
differentiated structure of environmental management systems on the basis on ISO 
14001 and EMAS is created which enables firms to advance more easily from a 
lower to a higher level of environmental management (systems). In Germany and 
Austria such low level entrances to environmental management supported by public 
authorities exist. One of them is called ‘eco-profit’. This initiative run by environmental 
consultancies is subsidised by local governments and offers firms a first 
environmental review and the development of an environmental action plan related to 
the review at low costs. Therefore, ‘eco-profit’ may be a first step, especially for 
smaller businesses to consider participation in ISO 14001 or EMAS. Another 
example of such low level entrances to environmental management provides the 
crafts agency of the German state Bavaria. It set up an initiative addressed to crafts 
firms all over Germany. Crafts companies can join the ‘Quality Network of 
environmental friendly Crafts Firms’ which leads them step by step to build up a 
certified environmental management system tailored to small firms of different crafts. 
The EMS rests on the basis of EMAS but requires less documentation and a less 
formalised structure (cf. Barth et al. 2001). In order to eschew a patchwork of 
numerous low level entrances to environmental management, the spectre of low level 
entrances has to be limited but should also contain entrances which are tailored to 
SMEs of different industries.     
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8.3 From EMAS to Environmental Product Policy? 
Several studies on EMAS illustrated that EMAS increased the eco-efficiency of 
companies, especially by the improvement of resource efficiency. Positive 
environmental outcomes of eco-efficiency concepts and approaches, such as e.g. 
EMAS, prove to be fragile because they are consumed by economic growth. To 
establish a linkage of EMAS-EMS-goals to national environmental quality goals and 
environmental goal priorities might serve as a promising starting point to avoid that 
EMAS is caught in the ‘trap of economic growth’ (cf. Dyllick 1999: 122; Seidel 1999: 
309 p.). However, EMAS II is not an appropriate policy instrument to foster processes 
of dematerialisation. Therefore, it has to be combined with policy instruments of 
environmental product policy, as e.g. product life cycle analysis or eco-labels. The 
European Union adopted an eco-labelling scheme in 1992, which rests on voluntary 
registration of participating companies. Eco-label criteria were developed for 12 
product groups. Although the European Commission regards the European eco-label 
as a success (cf. EC 2001), until 1999 only 42 licenses were granted to 31 
manufacturers and two importers for an entirety of 216 products, which bear the 
European blue flower logo (Barnes/Barnes 1999: 185). Moreover, the European eco-
labelling can be characterised as a marketing tool because it is not granted as a 
reward for improved environmental product quality: “Eco-labels are based on 
rewarding the least environmentally damaging and not the most environmentally 
friendly. On its own, therefore, an eco-label does not give enough information to the 
consumer about the environmental credentials of the product” (ibid). At the level of 
the European Union ideas to strengthen the eco-label, as e.g. by the abolition of its 
voluntary character, are rejected by the European Commission and several member 
states being regarded as a potential distortion to trade (ibid: 186).  
To enhance an environmentally friendly product policy, the European eco-labelling 
proved to be an insufficient approach. However, environmental product policy will 
remain a key domain of European environmental policy in order to reduce flows of 
materials and resources and to environmentally optimise product life cycles. The 
European Union could provide structures of opportunity to promote environmental 
relief by means of product policy. In my view promising starting points are inter-
industry and inter-company co-operations in product life cycle innovations (cf. 
Ammon et al. 1997; Henseling 2001). Such co-operation could be stimulated e.g. by 
economic incentives or on the basis of voluntary environmental agreements between 
industries and public authorities at the European and at the national level. 
Environmental agreements foster the introduction of more cost-effective measures 
because the agreed on solutions are tailored to environmental problems and to the 
involved industries (cf. Barnes/Barnes 1999: 180). Moreover, the European Union 
could create structures of opportunities to enhance local or regional capacities of 
action in respect to build up eco-industrial parks or to transform established 
conventional industry parks to eco-industrial parks. An interesting approach consists 
in the creation of eco-industrial networks, i.e. eco-industrial parks, in which firms of 
different branches are located enabling them to use the by-products or waste of one 
company as resource inputs to the production process of another company (cf. 
Willms 2004). Such eco-industrial networks may contribute to an environmentally 
advanced management of resources and material flows at the local or regional level. 
It remains to be seen, whether EMAS will be closer linked to or co-ordinated with 
approaches of European environmental product policy in future.        
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8.4 From EMAS to a European Standard of Sustainability 
Management? 
The principle of sustainability was established in the European Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Since then several initiatives were launched at the European Union level to promote 
sustainability. One of these initiatives, the European Commission’s green paper on a 
European policy strategy on corporate social responsibility underscores the triple 
bottom line approach on sustainability (EC 2001) which embraces the economic, 
social and environmental dimensions of sustainability. The green paper underlines 
the importance of EMAS in a European strategy on corporate social responsibility 
providing an appropriate instrument to evaluate the environmental performance of 
companies. It also contains proposals to assess the sustainability performance of 
companies by the introduction of social audits. In my view this European debate on 
corporate social responsibility might stimulate initiatives to develop a European 
standard for sustainability management systems embracing forms of financial, social 
and environmental auditing. EMAS may prove as one of the blueprints for such a new 
standard in respect to the voluntary participation and basic procedures of auditing 
and validation. There are hints that the policy competition on such a European 
standard started when the British Standard Institution published its new version of an 
integrated sustainability management standard developed during the SIGMA-
project18. Just to remember: In the case of EMAS one of the main blueprints the 
European Commission drew on in order to develop a first draft was the British 
Standard BS 7750.         
A potential new European standard of sustainability management might even face 
more severe problems than EMAS. Similar to EMAS such a standard would also be 
challenged by implementation problems of multi-level and multi-centred European 
policy structures. However, if such a standard of sustainability management consists 
of three different forms of financial, environmental and social auditing some specific 
problems will arise. An evaluation of the performance of companies in respect to 
sustainability is complicated because of interdependencies of social, economic and 
ecological dimensions of sustainability19. Therefore, three separate audits will not 
provide sufficient information to assess the sustainability performance related to 
specific companies, if there do not exist any precautions to detect and evaluate such 
interdependencies. Moreover, problems might occur related to an overall assessment 
and measurement of an entire company-sustainability performance covering the 
diverse dimensions of economic, social and ecological sustainability. There exists a 
variety of approaches to define the social dimension of sustainability. This variety 
requires processes of negotiation to agree on a set of sub-dimensions related to 
social sustainability at the company level. In recent debates and studies on 
sustainability work was acknowledged as a core category of social sustainability (cf. 
Brandl/Hildebrandt 2002; Ammon et al. 2002). However, problems arise from the 
                                                 
18 SIGMA denotes ‚Sustainability: Integrated Guidelines for Management’. More information on the SIGMA-
project is available on the British Standard Institution’s webpage www.bsi-global.com.  
 
19 For instance, if a company introduces clean production technologies preventing waste and pollution this 
investment may prove to be sustainable in economic terms because of costs reductions in waste and transaction 
costs related to the interaction with public authorities. In ecological respect the environmental performance of 
firms is improved. In social respect pollution and waste preventive technologies may threaten in-company jobs 
related to waste disposal or treatment. Dismissals can be regarded as a significant problem in respect to the social 
dimension of sustainability. To avoid dismissals would require trainings offered to these employees in order to 
meet requirements of job alternatives provided by the company. Trainings would enhance employees’ human 
resources but induce costs  - at least in the short run - at the same time.   
 50
altered character of work by new postfordistic production concepts. Scientific criteria 
of a humane design of work, organisation and technology were developed with 
reference to Fordism and Taylorism. They prove to be inappropriate to work 
situations in postfordistic production or service regimes, in which e.g. new forms of 
psychological stress and health problems occur, often related to the disentanglement 
of work. In labour studies a set of established criteria appropriate both to the 
evaluation of and a humane design of work in postfordistic work regimes has yet to 
be developed (cf. Becke 2003a). In case of an introduction of sustainability 
management systems to firms a core prerequisite for its successful implementation 
consists of the establishment of in-company spaces for dialogue to reflect 
interdependencies and side-effects of sustainability strategies and to enhance 
organisational sensitivity in respect to internal change processes and to the 
environments of firms (cf. Weick/Sutcliffe 2003). 
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